🛰️ 台灣灰色地帶與海底電纜監測

灰色地帶監測 深度文章

誰能登船執法？

Who Can Board and Enforce?

海洋法專區 03 • 緊追權 • 登臨權 • 普遍管轄權

Law of the Sea 03 • Hot Pursuit • Right of Visit • Universal Jurisdiction

本頁重點

In short

當外籍船在台灣外海斷纜，海巡到底能不能登船？答案藏在幾個「執行管轄」工具裡：登臨權（UNCLOS 第 110 條）、緊追權（第 111 條）、沿岸國保護權，以及國內的電信管理法第 72 條與海岸巡防法。問題是，這些工具各有嚴格的適用門檻——登臨權的列舉事由不含斷纜、緊追權要求追逐不中斷、國內法又受船旗國管轄牽制。為了補上缺口，部分學者芻議把普遍管轄權比照海盜延伸至惡意斷纜，但這仍屬發展中的倡議。

When a foreign ship cuts a cable off Taiwan, can the Coast Guard board it? The answer lies in a few "enforcement jurisdiction" tools: the right of visit (UNCLOS Art. 110), hot pursuit (Art. 111), coastal-state protective powers, and domestically the Telecommunications Management Act Art. 72 and the Coast Guard Act. The trouble is that each tool has strict thresholds — the right of visit's listed grounds do not include cable damage, hot pursuit must be uninterrupted, and domestic law is constrained by flag-state jurisdiction. To fill the gap, some scholars propose extending universal jurisdiction to malicious cable-cutting by analogy to piracy — still a developing proposal.

海洋法專區 SERIES → 海洋權益Maritime Rights 國際法保護Int'l Law 執法管轄Enforcement 台灣海纜現況TW Cables 全球海纜產業Global Cables
雷達上，那艘船還在。它剛剛拖斷了一條海纜，正以 8 節的速度往外海駛去。海巡艇就在不遠處，引擎已經發動。

指揮官只差一個命令——但他知道，按下那個命令之前，必須先在腦中跑完一整套國際法的檢查清單：它在哪個海域？掛什麼旗？我有沒有權登上去？這一篇，就是那份清單。

從「有沒有法」到「能不能動手」

前一篇談到，國際法給了海底電纜「立法管轄」的保護，卻沒給「執行管轄」的鑰匙。這一篇要追問的，是執行管轄那一側：究竟在什麼條件下，一個國家可以對一艘外籍船「動手」——登船、攔截、查扣、追訴？

UNCLOS 在公海自由的大原則下，留了幾道窄門。它們是沿岸國少數可以伸手的時刻，但每一道門都有嚴格的鎖。

On the radar, the ship is still there. It has just dragged a cable apart and is heading out to sea at 8 knots. The patrol boat is not far off, engines already running.

The commander needs only one order — but he knows that before he gives it, he must run a full international-law checklist in his head: which zone is it in? What flag does it fly? Do I have the right to board? This article is that checklist.

From "Is There a Law" to "Can I Act"

The previous article showed that international law gives cables "prescriptive" protection but withholds the key to "enforcement." This article asks the enforcement side: under what conditions may a state actually act against a foreign ship — board, intercept, seize, prosecute?

Beneath the grand principle of high-seas freedom, UNCLOS leaves a few narrow doors. They are the rare moments a coastal state may reach out — but each door has a strict lock.

工具箱：四把鑰匙與它們的鎖

UNCLOS 第 110 條 · 登臨權 Right of Visit
軍艦在公海的查核權
軍艦得對合理懷疑從事海盜、奴隸販運、未經許可廣播，或無國籍／假冒船旗的外籍船登臨查核（要求出示文件、必要時登船檢查）。

鎖：列舉事由不含「破壞海底電纜」。斷纜船除非同時觸及上述事由，否則無法單以斷纜為由援引第 110 條登臨。
UNCLOS 第 111 條 · 緊追權 Hot Pursuit
從管轄海域一路追到公海
當外籍船在內水、領海、鄰接區或 EEZ 違反沿岸國法令，沿岸國得自該海域起、以不中斷的追逐追至公海攔截。

鎖：追逐須「未曾中斷」，且被追船一進入本國或第三國領海即終止。對行跡飄忽、事後才被察覺的斷纜船，往往來不及啟動。
UNCLOS 第 25 / 220 條 · 沿岸國保護權
領海內的防護與環境管轄
沿岸國可在領海內採取必要步驟防止非無害通過（第 25 條），並在 EEZ 就船舶污染行使分級的執法權（第 220 條）。

鎖：多以「無害通過」與「污染」為樞紐，難以直接涵蓋外海的蓄意斷纜。
電信管理法 §72／§72-1 ・ 海岸巡防法 §4／§5
台灣的國內法工具
電信管理法第 72 條（112 年修正）將故意損壞海纜入罪；海岸巡防法第 4、5 條賦予海巡在管轄海域的執法、登檢、調查權限。

鎖：效力主要及於台灣領海與 EEZ；對公海外籍船仍受船旗國專屬管轄牽制，域外適用困難。

The Toolbox: Four Keys and Their Locks

UNCLOS Art. 110 · Right of Visit
A warship's high-seas power to inspect
A warship may visit and inspect a foreign ship reasonably suspected of piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or being stateless / falsely flagged (demand papers, board if needed).

The lock: the listed grounds do not include "submarine cable damage." Unless a cable-cutting ship also triggers one of the above, Art. 110 cannot be invoked on cable-damage grounds alone.
UNCLOS Art. 111 · Hot Pursuit
Chasing from your waters all the way to the high seas
When a foreign ship breaches a coastal state's laws in internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, or the EEZ, the coastal state may pursue it without interruption from that zone out onto the high seas and intercept it.

The lock: the pursuit must be "uninterrupted" and ends the moment the chased ship enters its own or a third state's territorial sea — often too slow for an elusive cable-cutter noticed only after the fact.
UNCLOS Arts. 25 / 220 · Coastal-State Protective Powers
Protection and environmental jurisdiction in the territorial sea
A coastal state may take steps in its territorial sea to prevent passage that is not innocent (Art. 25), and exercise graduated enforcement over vessel pollution in the EEZ (Art. 220).

The lock: these hinge on "innocent passage" and "pollution," and struggle to cover deliberate cable damage in distant waters.
Telecommunications Management Act §72/§72-1 · Coast Guard Act §4/§5
Taiwan's domestic tools
Art. 72 of the Telecommunications Management Act (2023 amendment) criminalizes intentional cable damage; Coast Guard Act Arts. 4-5 grant enforcement, boarding, and investigation powers in waters under jurisdiction.

The lock: reach is mainly Taiwan's territorial sea and EEZ; against high-seas foreign ships it remains constrained by exclusive flag-state jurisdiction, making extraterritorial application hard.

為什麼這些工具常常「用不上」？

把上面四把鑰匙放回真實案例——2025 年 1 月的興順 39 號、2 月的宏泰輪——就會看到它們為何頻頻卡關。

🔴 時機：事後才察覺
斷纜往往在深海、夜間、AIS 關閉的情況下發生，等到電信業者偵測到流量中斷、海巡趕赴現場，船早已駛離。緊追權要求「不中斷追逐」，但執法者連追逐的起點都錯過了。
🔴 事由：斷纜不在登臨清單
第 110 條列舉的登臨事由沒有「破壞海纜」。即使逮到船，若它沒有同時觸及海盜等事由，公海上的登臨權基礎仍然薄弱。
🔴 旗幟：權宜旗 + 空殼公司
船掛坦尚尼亞等權宜旗、由香港空殼公司持有、真正所有人層層隱身。即便台灣有國內法，仍撞上公海船旗國專屬管轄的牆，追訴須仰賴船旗國配合。

對照波羅的海的經驗——伊鵬三號（Yi Peng 3）、Eagle S 等案，部分沿岸國對涉嫌拖錨斷纜的可疑船採取了登船調查甚至扣留，展現「不只是抗議」的執法意志。2024 年成立的海纜韌性國際諮詢機構，也試圖把分散的國家行動連成跨國合作。台灣雖受外交地位限制，仍可從中借鏡。

Why Do These Tools So Often "Not Apply"?

Put the four keys back into real cases — Xing Shun 39 in January 2025, Hong Tai in February — and you see why they keep jamming.

🔴 Timing: noticed only after the fact
Cable cuts often happen in deep water, at night, with AIS off. By the time the carrier detects the outage and the Coast Guard reaches the scene, the ship has sailed. Hot pursuit demands "uninterrupted" chase, but enforcers miss even its starting point.
🔴 Grounds: cable damage is not on the visit list
Art. 110's listed grounds for visit do not include "cable damage." Even if the ship is caught, the basis for boarding on the high seas stays weak unless it also triggers piracy or another listed ground.
🔴 Flag: flag of convenience + shell company
The ship flies a flag of convenience such as Tanzania, is held by a Hong Kong shell company, and the real owner hides in layers. Even with domestic law, Taiwan hits the wall of exclusive high-seas flag-state jurisdiction, and prosecution depends on the flag state's cooperation.

By contrast, the Baltic experience — cases like Yi Peng 3 and Eagle S — shows some coastal states boarding and even detaining suspicious vessels suspected of dragging anchors across cables, a will to do more than protest. The International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience, established in 2024, tries to weave scattered national actions into cross-border cooperation. Constrained by its diplomatic status, Taiwan can still draw lessons from this.

芻議：把「惡意斷纜」比照海盜，納入普遍管轄？

面對船旗國管轄留下的執行缺口，部分學者提出一個大膽的方向：把蓄意破壞海底電纜，比照海盜，納入普遍管轄權（universal jurisdiction）。

為什麼是海盜？海盜是國際法上的「全人類公敵」（hostis humani generis），任何國家都可在公海登船、逮捕、追訴，不受船旗國管轄限制。其法理在於：海盜危害的是全體航海國家的共同利益。

倡議者的類比是：海底電纜是全球共享的關鍵基礎設施，蓄意斷纜危害的同樣是跨國公共利益，且常與灰色地帶脅迫相連。若能比照海盜納入普遍管轄，任一國家都能登船、追訴，正好填補船旗國專屬管轄的縫隙。UNCLOS 第 88、301 條揭示的「公海和平使用」原則，也可作為規範基礎。

務實的提醒：這仍是發展中的學理芻議，尚未成為實證國際法。要把惡意斷纜「升級」為普遍管轄罪行，需要新的條約共識或長期國家實踐，短期內難以實現。在那之前，常態化的海域感知、跨國證據鏈與輿論壓力，仍是受外交地位限制的台灣，最務實、可立即著手的方向——這也是本站公開可疑 AIS 軌跡的初衷。

A Proposal: Treat "Malicious Cable-Cutting" Like Piracy, Under Universal Jurisdiction?

Faced with the enforcement gap left by flag-state jurisdiction, some scholars propose a bold direction: fold deliberate damage to submarine cables into universal jurisdiction, by analogy to piracy.

Why Piracy?In international law, pirates are hostis humani generis — enemies of all humankind. Any state may board, arrest, and prosecute them on the high seas, free of flag-state limits, because piracy harms the shared interest of all seafaring nations.

The advocates' analogy: submarine cables are globally shared critical infrastructure, and deliberate cutting likewise harms a transnational public interest, often tied to gray-zone coercion. If folded into universal jurisdiction like piracy, any state could board and prosecute — precisely filling the crack left by exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. The "peaceful uses of the high seas" principle in UNCLOS Arts. 88 and 301 could serve as a normative anchor.

A practical caveat: this remains a developing scholarly proposal, not positive international law. "Upgrading" malicious cable-cutting to a universal-jurisdiction offense would need new treaty consensus or sustained state practice, unlikely in the short term. Until then, continuous maritime awareness, cross-border evidence chains, and public pressure remain the most practical path for a diplomatically constrained Taiwan — and the very reason this site publishes suspicious AIS tracks.

常見問題 FAQ

什麼是登臨權（right of visit）？
登臨權是 UNCLOS 第 110 條賦予軍艦在公海上對外籍船舶進行查核的權力，但僅限於特定情形：合理懷疑該船從事海盜、奴隸販運、未經許可廣播，或船舶無國籍、雖懸他國旗但實際與軍艦同一國籍等。查核程序通常包括要求出示船籍文件、必要時派員登船檢查。可惜「破壞海底電纜」並不在第 110 條列舉的事由之中，這是海纜執法的一大限制。
什麼是緊追權（hot pursuit）？
緊追權是 UNCLOS 第 111 條賦予沿岸國的權力：當有正當理由相信外籍船在其內水、領海、鄰接區或專屬經濟海域違反該國法令時，沿岸國得自該海域起、以不中斷的追逐方式一路追至公海加以攔截。但緊追必須「未曾中斷」，且一旦被追船進入其本國或第三國領海即告終止——這在實務上對行跡飄忽的斷纜船相當不利。
電信管理法第 72 條能對外籍船執法嗎？
電信管理法第 72 條（112 年修正）將故意損壞海底電纜訂為刑事犯罪，是台灣對抗斷纜的國內法基礎。但其效力主要及於台灣領海與專屬經濟海域；對於在公海或他國海域活動的外籍船，仍受國際法船旗國專屬管轄的限制，形成域外適用的難題。海岸巡防法第 4、5 條則賦予海巡在台灣管轄海域的執法與檢查權限。
為什麼有人主張把普遍管轄權擴張到海底電纜？
普遍管轄權目前主要適用於海盜、奴隸販運等「全人類公敵」行為，任何國家都可追訴。由於海底電纜是全球共享的關鍵基礎設施，蓄意破壞海纜的危害具有跨國公共性，部分學者因此芻議：應比照海盜，將惡意斷纜納入普遍管轄，讓任一國家都能登船、追訴，以填補船旗國管轄留下的執行缺口。這仍屬發展中的學理倡議，尚未成為實證國際法。

FAQ

What is the right of visit?
The right of visit (UNCLOS Art. 110) lets a warship inspect a foreign ship on the high seas, but only in specific cases: reasonable suspicion of piracy, the slave trade, unauthorized broadcasting, or that the ship is stateless or falsely flagged (e.g. actually of the warship's nationality). Inspection usually means demanding the ship's papers and, if needed, boarding. Unfortunately "submarine cable damage" is not among Art. 110's listed grounds — a major limit on cable enforcement.
What is hot pursuit?
Hot pursuit (UNCLOS Art. 111) lets a coastal state, when it has good reason to believe a foreign ship has broken its laws in internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, or the EEZ, pursue that ship from those waters in an uninterrupted chase onto the high seas and intercept it. But the pursuit must be "uninterrupted" and ends once the ship enters its own or a third state's territorial sea — in practice a poor fit for an elusive cable-cutter.
Can Telecommunications Management Act Art. 72 be enforced against foreign ships?
Art. 72 (2023 amendment) criminalizes intentional cable damage and is Taiwan's domestic basis against cable cuts. But its reach is mainly Taiwan's territorial sea and EEZ; against foreign ships operating on the high seas or in other states' waters it remains constrained by exclusive flag-state jurisdiction, creating an extraterritorial-application problem. Coast Guard Act Arts. 4-5 grant enforcement and inspection powers within waters under Taiwan's jurisdiction.
Why do some argue for extending universal jurisdiction to cables?
Universal jurisdiction currently applies mainly to "enemies of all humankind" such as piracy and the slave trade, which any state may prosecute. Because submarine cables are globally shared critical infrastructure and deliberate damage harms a transnational public interest, some scholars propose folding malicious cable-cutting into universal jurisdiction by analogy to piracy, so any state could board and prosecute and fill the gap left by flag-state jurisdiction. This is still a developing proposal, not yet positive international law.
← 02 國際法保護 ← 02 Int'l Law 下一篇：台灣海纜基礎設施現況 → Next: Taiwan's Cable Infrastructure →

參考資料 Sources

本頁概念可對照以下公開、權威來源核實：

本文執法工具與普遍管轄芻議，參酌李謁霏〈《海洋基本法》的法律構造·第十二講：海洋權益〉，《當代法律》2025 年 3 月號；波羅的海案例見公開新聞報導。

本頁為研究與教育用途；偵測訊號為待查線索，非法律或事實認定。詳見 方法論。

Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

The enforcement tools and universal-jurisdiction proposal draw on Li Yefei, "The Legal Structure of the Ocean Basic Act, Lecture 12: Maritime Rights," Contemporary Law Journal, March 2025; Baltic cases are from public news reporting.

This page is for research and education; detection signals are leads to investigate, not legal or factual findings. See the methodology.

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