🛰️ 台灣灰色地帶與海底電纜監測

灰色地帶監測 深度文章

我國執法框架
與挑戰

Taiwan's Enforcement Framework
and Challenges

深度文章系列 05 • 法律框架 • 旗國主義 • 國際合作

Article Series 05 • Legal Framework • Flag-State Jurisdiction • International Cooperation

系列文章 SERIES → 01 海底電纜 02 AIS 03 台灣現況 04 威脅 05 執法 06 方法論
2025 年 1 月 11 日，台灣海巡署接獲通報，趕赴台灣東北海域——電纜已經斷了，肇事船隻已不見蹤影。

海巡人員望著空蕩蕩的海面，手中沒有扣押令，沒有管轄權，甚至連船旗是哪個國家都還沒確認。這不是執法失職；這是制度性的困境。
On January 11, 2025, Taiwan's Coast Guard received a report and raced to Taiwan's northeastern waters — the cable was already cut, and the suspect vessel had vanished.

Coast Guard personnel stared at an empty sea, holding no detention warrant, no jurisdiction, not even confirmed knowledge of which flag state the vessel belonged to. This wasn't an enforcement failure; it was a systemic trap.

台灣的法律工具箱

2023 年之前，台灣對海底電纜的法律保護幾乎形同虛設。2023 年修正《電信管理法》第 72 條，是重要的立法進步，但仍面臨深層的管轄困境。

電信管理法 第 72 條（2023 年修正）
海底電纜損壞的刑事責任
任何人故意損壞、破壞海底電纜或海底管線，致生損害於公眾者，處 3 年以下有期徒刑、拘役或科或併科新臺幣 200 萬元以下罰金。如係重大損害，刑期可加重。

意義：這是台灣首次明確將損壞海底電纜列為刑事犯罪，並提供了具體的刑事追訴依據。
中華民國刑法 / 其他相關法規
既有的一般性適用條款
《刑法》毀損罪、《電信法》相關條款原本也可適用，但對於「在公海上、由外籍船隻造成的損壞」缺乏針對性規定，執法面臨很大的法律灰色地帶。

Taiwan's Legal Toolbox

Before 2023, Taiwan's legal protection for submarine cables was almost non-existent. The 2023 amendment to Article 72 of the Telecommunications Management Act was an important legislative advance, but still faces deep jurisdictional constraints.

Telecommunications Management Act Art. 72 (2023 Amendment)
Criminal Liability for Submarine Cable Damage
Anyone who intentionally damages or destroys a submarine cable or pipeline, causing harm to the public, shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 3 years, detention, or a fine of up to NT$2 million. Penalties are elevated for severe damage.

Significance: This is the first time Taiwan explicitly designated submarine cable damage as a criminal offense, providing a concrete basis for criminal prosecution.
ROC Criminal Code / Other Applicable Provisions
Pre-existing General Provisions
Criminal Code property destruction provisions and Telecommunications Act clauses could previously apply, but lacked specific provisions for "damage on the high seas by foreign vessels" — leaving a large legal gray zone.

最大的制度漏洞：旗國主義

即使台灣的國內法律再完善，都無法克服一個根本性的國際法障礙：旗國主義（Flag State Jurisdiction）。

🔴 核心困境：UNCLOS 第 92 條 / 第 94 條
根據《聯合國海洋法公約》（UNCLOS），在公海上航行的船隻受其船旗國的專屬管轄。這意味著：
  • 台灣海巡署無法在公海上強制登船檢查外籍船隻（除非有確鑿的違法現行犯跡象）
  • 即使確認船隻切斷了電纜，追訴權在於船旗國而非台灣
  • 如果船旗國是坦尚尼亞、多哥等國，而船隻實際由中國控制——這些國家幾乎不可能配合追訴
  • 台灣的外交地位使其更難推動國際刑事司法合作
🔴 制度漏洞：1884 年巴黎海底電纜保護公約
1884 年簽署的《保護海底電纜國際公約》是目前唯一專門保護海底電纜的國際公約，明定損壞電纜為可訴罪行，且不論船隻國籍均可由沿海國管轄。

問題在於：台灣不是任何國際條約的締約方（因外交地位問題），中華人民共和國也拒絕承認該公約對其有拘束力。換言之，這個 19 世紀的公約在台海情境下形同虛設。

The Biggest Institutional Gap: Flag-State Jurisdiction

No matter how robust Taiwan's domestic law becomes, it cannot overcome a fundamental barrier of international law: Flag-State Jurisdiction.

🔴 Core Dilemma: UNCLOS Art. 92 / Art. 94
Under UNCLOS, vessels sailing on the high seas are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state. This means:
  • Taiwan's Coast Guard cannot forcibly board foreign vessels on the high seas (unless there's clear evidence of current criminal activity)
  • Even when a vessel is confirmed to have cut a cable, prosecution rights rest with the flag state, not Taiwan
  • If the flag state is Tanzania, Togo, or similar countries but the vessel is effectively controlled by China — those countries will almost certainly not cooperate with prosecution
  • Taiwan's diplomatic status makes pushing for international criminal justice cooperation even harder
🔴 Institutional Gap: 1884 Paris International Submarine Telegraph Convention
The 1884 Paris Convention is the only international treaty specifically protecting submarine cables. It designates cable damage as a prosecutable offense and allows coastal state jurisdiction regardless of vessel nationality.

The problem: Taiwan is not a party to any international treaties (due to its diplomatic status), and the PRC refuses to recognize the convention as binding on it. In other words, this 19th-century convention is effectively inapplicable in the Taiwan Strait context.

現實案例：為何肇事者幾乎從不被追訴

興順 39 號追訴困境分析
  1. 船旗問題：船舶掛坦尚尼亞旗，但台灣無法直接要求坦尚尼亞協助追訴
  2. 所有人隱匿：真正所有人透過多層空殼公司隱藏，難以確認法律責任歸屬
  3. 現場證據：損壞發生在 4,000 公尺深海，無法即時採證
  4. 管轄缺口：台灣主張管轄的法律基礎在國際上難以獲得支持
  5. 外交管道：台灣缺乏正式外交管道向中國提出有法律效力的追訴請求
結果：台灣提出口頭抗議，船隻繼續在海上航行。

這不是個案。自 2023 年馬祖事件以來，所有涉嫌破壞台灣海底電纜的案件，目前尚無任何肇事者受到實質司法追訴。

Real Case Study: Why Perpetrators Almost Never Face Prosecution

Xing Shun 39 Prosecution Barrier Analysis
  1. Flag issue: Vessel flagged in Tanzania; Taiwan cannot directly demand Tanzania cooperate in prosecution
  2. Owner concealment: Real owner hidden through multiple shell companies; legal responsibility is hard to pinpoint
  3. Scene evidence: Damage occurred 4,000 meters underwater; real-time evidence collection is impossible
  4. Jurisdiction gap: Taiwan's legal basis for asserting jurisdiction lacks international support
  5. Diplomatic channels: Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic channels to submit legally binding prosecution demands to China
Result: Taiwan issued a verbal protest. The vessel continued sailing.

This is not an isolated case. Since the 2023 Matsu incident, no perpetrator in any case of suspected Taiwan submarine cable sabotage has faced substantive judicial prosecution.

96 艘黑名單船隻與國際因應

面對影子船隊的威脅，台灣及其友邦已開始採取更積極的非司法性應對措施。

台灣 — 黑名單制度
台灣海巡署及相關單位已建立可疑船隻黑名單，目前列有超過 96 艘具有異常行為紀錄的船隻，禁止其進入台灣港口或限制其在台灣海域的活動。
G7 — 影子船隊工作組
2024 年 G7 峰會將影子船隊列為重點議題，成立專責工作組協調各國的情報共享與聯合制裁。雖然台灣不是 G7 成員，但此一框架為台灣提供了潛在的多邊合作機會。
IMO — A.1192(33) 決議
2023 年國際海事組織通過 A.1192(33) 決議，呼籲各會員國加強對 AIS 操弄行為的管控，並要求旗國對 AIS 異常的船隻進行調查。雖然拘束力有限，但確立了國際規範基礎。
ICPC — 國際海底電纜保護委員會
台灣透過業界管道與 ICPC 合作，共享電纜損壞事件的情報，並參與最佳實踐討論。ICPC 雖非執法機構，但在建立國際意識與行為標準上扮演重要角色。

96 Blacklisted Vessels and International Responses

Facing the shadow fleet threat, Taiwan and its partners have begun taking more active non-judicial countermeasures.

Taiwan — Blacklist System
Taiwan's Coast Guard and related agencies have established a suspicious vessel blacklist, currently listing over 96 vessels with anomalous behavioral records, banning them from Taiwan's ports or restricting their activities in Taiwan's waters.
G7 — Shadow Fleet Working Group
The 2024 G7 Summit prioritized shadow fleets, establishing a dedicated working group to coordinate intelligence sharing and coordinated sanctions. While Taiwan is not a G7 member, this framework offers potential multilateral cooperation opportunities.
IMO — Resolution A.1192(33)
The IMO's 2023 Resolution A.1192(33) calls on member states to strengthen controls on AIS manipulation and requires flag states to investigate vessels with AIS anomalies. While its binding power is limited, it establishes an international normative foundation.
ICPC — International Cable Protection Committee
Taiwan cooperates with ICPC through industry channels, sharing intelligence on cable damage incidents and participating in best-practice discussions. While not an enforcement body, ICPC plays an important role in building international awareness and behavioral standards.

台灣的獨特困境

大多數國家在處理海底電纜安全時，可以依賴以下工具：正式外交管道、雙邊司法互助條約（MLA）、國際刑警組織協作，以及向聯合國安理會提出議題的能力。台灣幾乎無法使用上述任何一項。

這造成一個弔詭的處境：台灣是全球最依賴海底電纜的地區之一，但在保護這些電纜的國際法律框架中，卻是最缺乏發言權的。

根本矛盾：保護海底電纜需要的是事前嚇阻，而不只是事後追訴。當肇事者知道台灣幾乎無法追訴它們時，破壞電纜的成本幾乎為零。這正是為什麼主動監測、早期預警，以及讓國際社會看見可疑行為，成為台灣目前最有效的防禦手段之一。

深入的法律分析，請參閱本站的研究文章：海底電纜法律保護框架分析。

Taiwan's Unique Dilemma

Most countries dealing with submarine cable security can rely on: formal diplomatic channels, bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance treaties (MLAs), Interpol cooperation, and the ability to raise issues at the UN Security Council. Taiwan effectively has access to none of these.

This creates a paradoxical situation: Taiwan is among the world's most dependent regions on submarine cables, yet has the least voice in the international legal frameworks designed to protect them.

The fundamental contradiction: Protecting submarine cables requires pre-incident deterrence, not just post-incident prosecution. When perpetrators know Taiwan can barely prosecute them, the cost of sabotaging cables is nearly zero. This is precisely why active monitoring, early warning, and making suspicious behavior visible to the international community has become one of Taiwan's most effective current defensive tools.

For in-depth legal analysis, see our research article: Submarine Cable Legal Protection Framework Analysis.

建議方向

Recommended Directions

其他國家如何因應海纜威脅？

台灣並不孤單。2023 年以來，波羅的海接連發生海纜與天然氣管線受損事件，促使歐洲國家把「海底基礎設施保護」從邊緣議題推上國安核心。台灣可以從這些做法中借鏡。

🛡️
北約加強巡邏北約於波羅的海啟動專責的海底基礎設施巡護任務，結合艦艇、空中偵察與無人載具，提高關鍵海域的存在感與嚇阻力。
⚖️
果斷登檢與扣留部分沿海國對涉嫌拖錨斷纜、且行跡可疑的船舶採取登船調查甚至扣留，公開報導中的 Eagle S 案即為一例，展現「不只是抗議」的執法意志。
🔗
情報共享與航運究責透過跨國資料共享，鎖定影子船隊、保險與旗國鏈條，從船舶登記與保險端施壓，而不只在事發後追緝個別船隻。

這些經驗的共同訊息是：海纜安全無法只靠事後修復或外交抗議，而需要常態化的海域感知、快速反應的法律工具，以及國際合作三者並進。對地處第一線、又面臨旗國主義困境的台灣而言，強化開源海域監測與跨國證據鏈，正是相對務實、可立即著手的方向。

How Other Countries Are Responding to Cable Threats

Taiwan is not alone. Since 2023, a string of cable and gas-pipeline incidents in the Baltic Sea has pushed "undersea infrastructure protection" from a fringe topic to the core of national security in Europe. Taiwan can draw lessons from these responses.

🛡️
NATO steps up patrolsNATO launched a dedicated undersea-infrastructure patrol effort in the Baltic, combining ships, air surveillance, and uncrewed platforms to raise presence and deterrence in critical waters.
⚖️
Decisive boarding and detentionSome coastal states have boarded and even detained vessels suspected of dragging anchors across cables while behaving suspiciously — the publicly reported Eagle S case is one example — showing a will to do more than protest.
🔗
Intelligence sharing and shipping accountabilityCross-border data sharing targets shadow fleets and the insurance/flag-state chain, applying pressure at registration and insurance — not just chasing individual ships after the fact.

The common message: cable security cannot rest on after-the-fact repair or diplomatic protest alone; it needs continuous maritime awareness, fast-acting legal tools, and international cooperation advancing together. For Taiwan — on the front line and constrained by flag-state jurisdiction — strengthening open-source maritime monitoring and cross-border evidence chains is a comparatively practical place to start now.

常見問題 FAQ

台灣有法律處罰切斷海底電纜嗎？
有。2023 年修正《電信管理法》第 72 條，故意損壞海底電纜可處 3 年以下有期徒刑、拘役或併科最高 200 萬元罰金。
為什麼肇事船隻很少被起訴？
依《聯合國海洋法公約》第 92 條，公海船舶受船旗國專屬管轄。台灣難以登船檢查或追訴外籍船，且肇事者常透過空殼公司隱匿。
1884 年海底電纜公約能保護台灣嗎？
不能。台灣因外交地位並非締約方，中國也拒絕承認其拘束力，使這個 19 世紀的公約在台海情境形同虛設。
台灣目前如何因應？
建立逾 96 艘可疑船黑名單、與友邦進行非正式海事合作、參與 G7 影子船隊框架，並透過公開可疑 AIS 軌跡建立國際輿論壓力。

FAQ

Does Taiwan have laws punishing cable cutting?
Yes. The 2023 amendment to Telecommunications Management Act Article 72 allows up to 3 years' imprisonment, detention, or a fine up to NT$2 million for intentionally damaging a cable.
Why are perpetrators rarely prosecuted?
Under UNCLOS Article 92, vessels on the high seas fall under exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. Taiwan can rarely board or prosecute foreign vessels, and owners often hide behind shell companies.
Does the 1884 Submarine Cable Convention protect Taiwan?
No. Taiwan is not a party due to its diplomatic status, and China rejects its binding force — rendering this 19th-century convention effectively inapplicable in the Taiwan Strait.
How is Taiwan responding?
By maintaining a blacklist of 96+ suspicious vessels, pursuing informal maritime cooperation with partners, engaging G7 shadow-fleet frameworks, and publishing suspicious AIS tracks to build international pressure.
← 04 海底電纜威脅 ← 04 Cable Threats 下一篇：本網站所使用之方法 → Next: Our Methodology →

參考資料 Sources

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Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

This page is for research and education; detection signals are leads to investigate, not legal or factual findings. See the methodology.

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