國防雜誌研究摘要 • UNCLOS • 1884年公約 • 國際合作
Defense Journal Research Summary • UNCLOS • 1884 Convention • International Cooperation
近年臺灣海底電纜頻繁遭斷，除了固有的自然電纜損壞因素外，還可能包含了中共「影子船隊」發動的灰色地帶戰術，由註冊在其他國家的「權宜船」，破壞海底通訊基礎設施，意圖削弱臺灣數位韌性。由於國際法如《聯合國海洋法公約》對於在公海的電纜破壞行為，其制裁權歸屬於船籍國對此缺乏第三方有效制裁與執行機制，導致中共能以低風險行動製造高破壞性結果，成為臺海衝突的潛在引爆點。面對此種「灰色地帶」威脅，呼籲我國應建立跨部門應對平台並加入國際海底電纜保護機制，遏止「影子船隊」的擴張。唯有透過法律、外交、科技與國際合作的多重手段，方能維護臺灣與全球數位通訊的戰略安全。
In recent years, Taiwan's undersea cables have been frequently severed. Beyond the usual causes of natural cable damage, these incidents may also involve gray-zone tactics deployed by the PRC's "shadow fleet." Composed of flags of convenience vessels, these fleets are suspected of targeting undersea communications infrastructure with the intent to undermine Taiwan's digital resilience. International law, such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), grants authority for cable sabotage on the high seas to the vessel's flag state, leaving a gap in effective third-party sanctions or enforcement mechanisms. Taiwan is urged to establish an interagency response platform, actively participate in international submarine cable protection mechanisms, and curb the expansion of the shadow fleet. Protecting undersea cables is not merely a technical challenge -- it is a strategic imperative for preserving peace and global connectivity.
「影子船隊」一詞最初指俄羅斯為規避國際制裁而組建的老舊油輪船隊，透過頻繁更換船旗國、關閉AIS、利用空殼公司隱匿所有權來運輸石油。近年來，中共將相同手法移植到對海底電纜的灰色地帶行動中：以註冊在第三國的「權宜船」（flags of convenience）進行電纜破壞，既利用民用船舶身分規避軍事對抗的風險，又藉由船籍國管轄權的法律壁壘阻擋受害國的追訴。
2025年1月，坦尚尼亞籍貨輪「興順39號」（香港公司所有）在AIS關閉的狀態下，於臺灣北部海域拖錨切斷台亞美海底電纜（Taiwan-Asia-US Cable）。2025年2月，多哥籍「鴻泰58號」切斷臺灣至澎湖的海底電纜。此前，2024年11月波羅的海也發生中國籍「伊鵬三號」涉嫌切斷海底電纜的事件，凸顯此類行動已非孤立案例，而是具有系統性特徵的灰色地帶戰術。
| 特徵 | 評估（臺灣案例） | 說明 |
|---|---|---|
| 模糊性 Ambiguity | 5/5 | 權宜船身分掩護，事故/蓄意難以區分 |
| 否認性 Deniability | 3/5 | 空殼公司與多層旗幟國隱匿幕後操控方 |
| 漸進性 Gradualism | 2/5 | 每次斷纜看似獨立事件，累積效應才顯現 |
臺灣目前擁有14條國際海底電纜與10條國內海纜。其中馬祖僅有2條對外海纜，金門僅有1條海纜加1條備援。近年電纜斷裂頻率顯著上升：年均斷纜7至9次，2023年躍升至12次，2025年僅前2個月即發生4次。此趨勢與影子船隊活動的擴張高度吻合。
The term "shadow fleet" originally referred to Russia's aging tanker fleet assembled to circumvent international sanctions, using frequent flag changes, AIS shutdowns, and shell companies to transport oil. The PRC has now adapted the same playbook for gray-zone operations against submarine cables: flags of convenience (FoC) vessels carry out cable sabotage, exploiting their civilian identity to avoid military confrontation while using flag-state jurisdiction as a legal shield against prosecution by victim states.
In January 2025, the Tanzanian-flagged cargo vessel "Xing Shun 39" (owned by a Hong Kong company) dragged anchor with AIS off, severing the Taiwan-Asia-US Cable in waters north of Taiwan. In February 2025, the Togo-flagged "Hong Tai 58" cut the Taiwan-Penghu submarine cable. Earlier, in November 2024, the Chinese-registered "Yi Peng 3" was implicated in cutting submarine cables in the Baltic Sea, underscoring that these are not isolated accidents but part of a systematic gray-zone pattern.
| Characteristic | Rating (Taiwan Cases) | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Ambiguity | 5/5 | FoC vessel cover makes accident vs. deliberate act indistinguishable |
| Deniability | 3/5 | Shell companies and layered flag states obscure the controlling party |
| Gradualism | 2/5 | Each cable break appears isolated; cumulative impact only emerges over time |
Taiwan currently has 14 international and 10 domestic submarine cables. Matsu has only 2 external cables, and Kinmen only 1 plus 1 backup. Cable breaks have risen sharply: the annual average of 7-9 jumped to 12 in 2023, and 4 occurred in just the first 2 months of 2025. This trend closely correlates with expanded shadow fleet activity.
上述條文的結合造成了「執法真空」：即便受害國有充分證據證明電纜遭蓄意破壞，仍須依賴船籍國主動啟動刑事程序。而影子船隊刻意選擇執法能力薄弱或缺乏動機的國家作為船籍國（如坦尚尼亞、多哥、喀麥隆），正是利用此一漏洞。
然而，1884年公約目前僅有36個簽約國，且臺灣與中華人民共和國均非締約方。因此，儘管該公約提供了理論上更強的法律工具，在實際適用於臺海電纜事件時仍有根本性的法律障礙。
此修法強化了臺灣在領海及專屬經濟區內的執法基礎，但對於在公海或他國管轄水域內活動的外國權宜船，管轄權仍受到國際法框架的嚴格限制。未來可能的法律路徑包括「補充管轄權」（以電纜登陸於臺灣領土為管轄連結點）與「普遍管轄權」（將電纜破壞視為危害全球通訊安全的國際犯罪）。
The combination of these provisions creates an "enforcement vacuum": even when a victim state has ample evidence of deliberate cable sabotage, it must rely on the flag state to initiate criminal proceedings. Shadow fleets deliberately register under states with weak enforcement capacity or no motivation (e.g., Tanzania, Togo, Cameroon), precisely exploiting this gap.
However, the 1884 Convention currently has only 36 signatories, and neither Taiwan nor the PRC is a party. Thus, despite its theoretically stronger legal tools, the convention faces fundamental legal barriers in actual application to Taiwan Strait cable incidents.
This amendment strengthens Taiwan's enforcement within its territorial waters and EEZ, but jurisdiction over foreign FoC vessels operating on the high seas or in other states' waters remains strictly constrained by the international legal framework. Possible future legal paths include "supplementary jurisdiction" (using cable landing on Taiwanese territory as the jurisdictional nexus) and "universal jurisdiction" (treating cable sabotage as an international crime against global communications security).
建立由海委會、交通部、國防部、國安會等機關組成的常態性跨部門應對平台，整合海域監控、情報分析與執法能量。開發自動化電纜預警系統，即時偵測電纜路線附近的異常船舶行為並啟動應變機制。
建立影子船隊資料庫並與國際海底電纜保護委員會（ICPC）、保險業者及港口國共享。自2024年9月以來已追蹤96艘可疑船隻，應將此清單制度化，與盟友共同維護並即時更新。
積極參與2024年《紐約海底電纜安全與韌性聯合聲明》（17國簽署）、QUAD海底電纜連結夥伴關係、G7影子船隊工作小組等國際機制。透過盟友的外交支持，擴大臺灣在海纜保護議題上的國際能見度與參與空間。
研擬國內法授權海巡署在領海及鄰接區內攔截涉嫌破壞電纜的外國船舶。推動「補充管轄權」的法律論述，以海纜登陸於臺灣領土為管轄連結點，突破船籍國專屬管轄的限制。長期目標為推動海底電纜破壞行為納入「普遍管轄權」範疇。
透過外交途徑向權宜船籍國施壓，要求其履行UNCLOS第94條「真正聯繫」（genuine link）義務及IMO第A.1192(33)號決議所要求的船舶登記管理責任。對未善盡管轄責任的船籍國，可透過港口國檢查（PSC）、保險限制等經濟手段施加壓力。
提升海域覺知（MDA）能力，結合AIS、SAR衛星、AI演算法（如本監測站所示範）進行全天候船舶追蹤與異常行為偵測。推進臺美海巡合作備忘錄的落實，強化聯合巡邏與情報共享能量。
透過友邦（如UNCLOS成員國帛琉）向國際海洋法法庭提起案件，建立海纜保護的國際判例。同時推動對影子船隊所有人的民事訴訟，追究其經濟責任，提高灰色地帶行動的成本。
Establish a standing interagency coordination platform comprising the Ocean Affairs Council, Ministry of Transportation, Ministry of National Defense, and National Security Council. Develop an automated cable-alert system that detects anomalous vessel behavior near cable routes in real time and triggers response protocols.
Build a shadow fleet database and share it with the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC), maritime insurers, and port states. Since September 2024, 96 suspect vessels have been tracked; this list should be institutionalized, jointly maintained with allies, and updated in real time.
Actively engage with the 2024 New York Joint Statement on Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables (17 signatory nations), the QUAD Cable Connectivity Partnership, and the G7 Shadow Fleet Task Force. Through allied diplomatic support, expand Taiwan's international visibility and participation in cable-protection mechanisms.
Draft domestic legislation authorizing the Coast Guard to intercept foreign vessels suspected of cable sabotage within territorial and contiguous waters. Advance the legal argument for "supplementary jurisdiction" using cable landings on Taiwanese territory as the jurisdictional nexus. The long-term goal: push for submarine cable sabotage to be recognized under "universal jurisdiction."
Apply diplomatic pressure on FoC flag states to fulfill their "genuine link" obligations under UNCLOS Article 94 and vessel registration responsibilities under IMO Resolution A.1192(33). Economic measures such as port state control (PSC) inspections and insurance restrictions can be leveraged against non-compliant flag states.
Upgrade Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) capabilities by integrating AIS, SAR satellite imagery, and AI algorithms (as demonstrated by this monitoring site) for 24/7 vessel tracking and anomaly detection. Advance implementation of the US-Taiwan Coast Guard MOU to strengthen joint patrols and intelligence sharing.
Through allies that are UNCLOS members (such as Palau), bring cases before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to establish international precedent for cable protection. Simultaneously pursue civil litigation against shadow fleet owners to impose economic accountability and raise the cost of gray-zone operations.
《聯合國海洋法公約》第113條要求各締約國制定國內法，對故意或因過失破壞公海海底電纜的行為處以刑罰。然而，第92條與第94條規定公海上的船舶僅受船籍國管轄，第三國無權執法。這意味著即使發現外國船隻破壞海底電纜，受害國也無法直接扣押或處罰該船隻，必須依賴船籍國的配合——而船籍國往往缺乏動機或能力進行有效制裁，形成了重大的執法漏洞。
1884年公約第2條第1款規定故意破壞海底電纜為刑事犯罪，第8條第2款更賦予受害國在船籍國未能履行管轄責任時行使「補充管轄權」的法律基礎。理論上，這為受害國提供了比UNCLOS更有力的執法工具。然而，該公約目前僅有36個簽約國，臺灣與中華人民共和國均非締約方，因此該公約在法律上並不適用於臺海電纜事件。
中共利用以第三國旗幟註冊的民用船舶（權宜船）對海底電纜進行破壞，藉由UNCLOS船籍國專屬管轄權的法律屏障，使受害國無法直接對這些船隻執法。此手法將「民用身分」轉化為法律武器，既避免軍事對抗升級，又能持續製造基礎設施破壞，是灰色地帶法律戰的核心策略。
主要手段包括：頻繁變更船名與船旗國以消除身分連續性；關閉AIS自動識別系統使船舶「消失」；透過空殼公司層層隱匿實際所有人；進行海上旁靠（STS）以避免進港檢查。以「興順39號」為例：坦尚尼亞旗幟、香港公司、事發時AIS關閉，完整體現此套規避體系。
2023年修正的《電信管理法》第72條將損害海纜登陸站及其連接線路列為刑事犯罪，提供了國內法基礎。但管轄範圍主要限於臺灣領海及專屬經濟區，對公海或他國管轄水域的外國船隻，執法權仍受國際法框架限制。刑法毀損罪亦可能適用，但同樣面臨域外管轄挑戰。
2024年《紐約海底電纜安全與韌性聯合聲明》（17國簽署）；QUAD海底電纜連結夥伴關係；G7影子船隊工作小組；IMO第A.1192(33)號決議要求加強船舶登記管理與旗幟國責任；東京備忘錄（Tokyo MOU）提供港口國檢查區域合作機制。臺灣可透過盟友間接參與，強化海纜保護。
UNCLOS Article 113 requires states parties to enact domestic laws penalizing deliberate or negligent damage to submarine cables on the high seas. However, Articles 92 and 94 stipulate that vessels on the high seas are subject exclusively to flag-state jurisdiction -- third-party states have no enforcement authority. This means that even with clear evidence of cable sabotage by a foreign vessel, the victim state cannot detain or penalize the ship and must rely on the flag state's cooperation, which is often lacking in motivation or capacity, creating a critical enforcement gap.
The 1884 Convention's Article 2(1) criminalizes deliberate cable damage, and Article 8(2) provides a legal basis for victim states to exercise "supplementary jurisdiction" when the flag state fails to act -- a more powerful enforcement tool than UNCLOS offers. However, with only 36 signatories and neither Taiwan nor the PRC being parties, the convention does not legally apply to Taiwan Strait cable incidents.
The PRC uses civilian vessels registered under third-country flags (flags of convenience) to sabotage submarine cables, hiding behind UNCLOS's flag-state exclusive jurisdiction to block victim-state enforcement. This tactic weaponizes "civilian identity" as a legal shield -- avoiding military escalation while sustaining infrastructure damage. It is the core strategy of gray-zone lawfare.
Key methods include: frequent name and flag changes to erase identity continuity; AIS shutdowns to disappear from monitoring systems; shell companies to obscure beneficial ownership; and ship-to-ship (STS) transfers to avoid port inspections. The "Xing Shun 39" exemplifies this: Tanzanian flag, Hong Kong company, AIS off at time of incident -- the full evasion playbook.
The 2023 amendment to the Telecommunications Management Act Article 72 criminalizes damage to cable landing stations and connected cables, providing a domestic legal foundation. However, jurisdiction is mainly limited to Taiwan's territorial waters and EEZ; enforcement over foreign vessels in international waters remains constrained by international law. Criminal damage statutes may also apply but face similar extraterritorial jurisdiction challenges.
The 2024 New York Joint Statement on Security and Resilience of Undersea Cables (17 signatory nations); the QUAD Cable Connectivity Partnership; the G7 Shadow Fleet Task Force; IMO Resolution A.1192(33) requiring enhanced vessel registration and flag-state responsibility; and the Tokyo MOU providing a regional port state control inspection framework. Taiwan can participate indirectly through allies to strengthen cable protection capabilities.