海底電纜所受到的威脅

系列文章 SERIES → 01 海底電纜 02 AIS 03 台灣現況 04 威脅 05 執法 06 方法論

全球每年約 100 到 200 起海底電纜中斷事件。多數發生在你從未聽說過的地方，多數在幾週內修復完畢，多數沒有人注意到。

但「多數」不是「全部」。有些斷纜，是蓄意造成的。而在台灣周邊海域，這條線愈來愈難辨清。

About 100 to 200 submarine cable outages occur globally every year. Most happen in places you've never heard of, most are repaired within weeks, and most go unnoticed.

But "most" isn't "all." Some cable cuts are deliberate. And in Taiwan's surrounding waters, that line is becoming increasingly blurry.

100–200

全球每年電纜中斷件數

global cable outages per year

41%

來自漁業（拖網鉤掛）

caused by fishing (trawl snagging)

16%

來自船錨拖拉

caused by ship anchors

0.13%

台灣附近海域面積佔比，卻承受異常高比例事件

of ocean area near Taiwan — disproportionate incident share

威脅的三個層次

電纜面臨的威脅可以分為三個截然不同的類型，判斷難度和應對方式各有差異。

第一層：自然威脅

海洋本身是電纜的第一大敵。海底地震可在幾秒內同時切斷數條電纜；海底山崩引發的濁流可以掃過電纜路徑；腐蝕和生物損害則是長期的自然耗損。這類威脅無法預防，只能透過路由設計迴避高風險地質區、並建立足夠備援。

第二層：意外損壞

漁船拖網（41%）和船錨（16%）構成電纜損壞的最大宗來源。大型底拖網可深達 500 公尺，輕易鉤住淺海電纜；大型貨輪的重型船錨落底時產生的衝擊，足以切斷電纜盔甲。這類意外多屬過失，非蓄意——但在敏感海域頻繁發生時，「意外」的解釋就需要謹慎審視。

第三層：蓄意破壞（灰色地帶攻擊）

這是本站監測的核心威脅。蓄意破壞的操作者故意偽裝成「意外」，以規避追責——使用漁船或貨船而非軍艦，選擇難以即時舉證的深夜海域，並在行動前關閉 AIS。正因難以與「意外」區分，這成為灰色地帶戰術的完美工具。

Three Layers of Threat

Threats to cables fall into three distinct categories, each with different detection difficulty and response requirements.

Layer 1: Natural Threats

The ocean itself is a cable's first enemy. Submarine earthquakes can simultaneously sever multiple cables in seconds; turbidity currents triggered by underwater landslides can sweep through cable paths; corrosion and biological damage cause long-term natural wear. These threats cannot be prevented — only mitigated through route design to avoid high-risk geological zones and by building sufficient redundancy.

Layer 2: Accidental Damage

Fishing trawl nets (41%) and ship anchors (16%) account for the largest share of cable damage. Large bottom trawls can reach 500 meters deep, easily snagging shallow-water cables; the impact of heavy anchors from large cargo ships can cut through cable armor. Most such incidents are accidental, not deliberate — but when they occur frequently in sensitive waters, the "accident" explanation warrants careful scrutiny.

Layer 3: Deliberate Sabotage (Gray Zone Attacks)

This is the core threat this site monitors. Deliberate saboteurs intentionally disguise their actions as "accidents" to avoid accountability — using fishing boats or cargo vessels rather than warships, choosing deep-water areas where real-time evidence is impossible, and disabling AIS before acting. Because it's indistinguishable from "accident," this becomes a perfect gray zone tactic.

自然威脅的現實：2006 年恆春地震

2006 年 12 月 26 日凌晨，一場芮氏規模 7.0 的地震在恆春外海發生。地震引發的海底山崩，在數小時內同時切斷了 7 條通過台灣南部海域的國際海底電纜。

2006 恆春地震影響

台灣、香港與東南亞之間的國際電話和網路嚴重中斷
中國大陸、日本、韓國的跨太平洋通訊受到影響
部分金融市場出現交易中斷
最後一條受損電纜直至 2007 年 2 月才完成修復——前後耗時近 49 天
動員了全球多艘海纜維修船同時作業，仍需如此長的時間

這次事件清楚示範了「多條電纜同時斷裂」的系統性衝擊，也警示了電纜備援不足的危險。

Natural Threats in Reality: The 2006 Hengchun Earthquake

On the morning of December 26, 2006, a magnitude 7.0 earthquake struck offshore Hengchun. The resulting submarine landslides simultaneously severed 7 international submarine cables passing through Taiwan's southern waters within hours.

2006 Hengchun Earthquake Impact

Severe disruption to international telephone and internet between Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Southeast Asia
Transpacific communications from mainland China, Japan, and South Korea affected
Some financial markets experienced trading interruptions
The last damaged cable wasn't repaired until February 2007 — nearly 49 days in total
Multiple global cable repair ships deployed simultaneously still required this long

This event clearly demonstrated the systemic impact of "multiple simultaneous cable breaks," and warned of the dangers of insufficient cable redundancy.

影子船隊：灰色地帶攻擊的完美工具

近年來，一種被稱為「影子船隊」（Shadow Fleet）的龐大網絡逐漸浮現在國際視野中。這些船隻的共同特徵是：旗籍不明或頻繁更換、所有人結構複雜（多層空殼公司）、AIS 記錄異常，以及出現在敏感海域時無法解釋其行為目的。

起初，影子船隊主要被用於俄羅斯石油制裁規避——自 2022 年俄烏戰爭以來，數百艘油輪以這種方式繞過西方制裁。但安全分析師開始注意到，同樣的船隊也出現在台灣、波羅的海等地的海底電纜附近，而且它們的行為模式並不符合正常航行或漁業作業。

關鍵轉折點：當一艘不明國籍的散裝貨船，以不明理由在凌晨出現在海底電纜路線上方，低速徘徊，然後關閉 AIS，隔天早上電纜斷了——這還能算是「意外」嗎？

Shadow Fleets: The Perfect Tool for Gray Zone Attacks

In recent years, a sprawling network known as the "Shadow Fleet" has emerged into international view. These vessels share common characteristics: unclear or frequently-changed flagging, complex ownership structures (multiple shell companies), anomalous AIS records, and appearing in sensitive waters with no explicable operational purpose.

Initially, shadow fleets were primarily used for Russian oil sanctions evasion — since the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, hundreds of tankers have circumvented Western sanctions this way. But security analysts began noticing the same fleet appearing near submarine cables around Taiwan, the Baltic Sea, and elsewhere, with behavioral patterns inconsistent with normal sailing or fishing operations.

The critical turning point: When a cargo vessel of unclear nationality appears for no apparent reason over a submarine cable route at 3am, loiters at low speed, then disables AIS, and the next morning the cable is cut — can we still call this an "accident"?

近年重大事件時間軸

Recent Major Incidents Timeline

2023 Feb

馬祖雙纜事件 / Matsu Double-Cut Incident

2 月 2 日及 8 日，兩艘中國漁船（據報導）分別切斷馬祖的兩條海底電纜（PCCS 與 MATSU-T）。馬祖 1.4 萬居民長達 50 天失去網路連線。台灣以「意外」無法追訴肇事船隻。

On Feb 2 and 8, two Chinese fishing vessels (reportedly) severed both of Matsu's submarine cables (PCCS and MATSU-T). 14,000 Matsu residents lost internet for ~50 days. Taiwan was unable to prosecute the vessels under the "accident" framework.
2024 Nov

伊鵬三號事件 / Yi Peng 3 Incident (Baltic Sea)

中國船舶「伊鵬三號」在波羅的海先後切斷連接芬蘭與德國的「C-Lion 1」電纜，以及連接瑞典與立陶宛的電纜。丹麥海軍封鎖該船長達 5 週，中方拒絕配合調查。事件引發 NATO 各國對海底電纜脆弱性的高度警覺，也使「中國船隻切斷電纜」的模式首次受到歐洲媒體的大規模關注。

The Chinese vessel Yi Peng 3 sequentially severed the "C-Lion 1" cable connecting Finland and Germany, and a cable between Sweden and Lithuania in the Baltic Sea. Danish naval vessels blockaded the ship for 5 weeks; China refused to cooperate with the investigation. The incident placed NATO nations on high alert about cable vulnerability, and brought the pattern of "Chinese vessels severing cables" to widespread European media attention for the first time.
2025 Jan 11

興順 39 號 / Xing Shun 39

中國籍散裝貨輪「興順 39 號」（MMSI：412703070，旗籍：坦尚尼亞）在台灣東北海域航行時，於距台亞美（TAW-US）海底電纜約 10 公里處關閉 AIS，之後被確認已切斷電纜。台灣海巡署趕赴現場時，該船已駛離。後查明船隻疑似為中國影子船隊成員，實際所有人透過多層空殼公司隱匿。

The Chinese bulk carrier Xing Shun 39 (MMSI: 412703070, flag: Tanzania) was operating in Taiwan's northeastern waters when it disabled AIS approximately 10 km from the TAW-US cable route, after which the cable was confirmed severed. Taiwan's Coast Guard arrived to find the vessel already gone. Subsequent investigation revealed the vessel was likely a Chinese shadow fleet member, with its actual owner concealed through multiple shell companies.
2025 Feb

鴻泰 58 號 / Hong Tai 58

中國籍散裝貨輪「鴻泰 58 號」在馬祖北方海域被疑似切斷另一條電纜。與興順 39 號案如出一轍：船隻在事後迅速駛離，調查陷入旗國主義困境。台灣政府正式提出外交抗議，但肇事者至今未受追訴。

The Chinese bulk carrier Hong Tai 58 is suspected of severing another cable in waters north of Matsu. The pattern mirrored Xing Shun 39: the vessel quickly departed after the incident, and the investigation stalled in flag-state jurisdiction. Taiwan's government lodged a formal diplomatic protest, but the perpetrators remain unprosecuted.

技術升級：深海切割能力

分析人士還指出一個更令人憂慮的趨勢：中國正在發展針對深海電纜的主動切割技術。傳統的「意外」手法主要發生在淺海（200 公尺以內），因為深海電纜難以被一般漁業活動觸及。

但據研究報告，中國海軍研究機構已取得相關深海作業裝備的專利，可以在更深的海底切割電纜，而這些位置遠離任何合理的漁業或商業航行需求。這意味著「假裝意外」的操作空間正在擴大到原本幾乎沒有掩護的深海環境。

為什麼深海更難監測？深海電纜（>1000 公尺）的損壞既難以由衛星偵測，修復難度也遠高於淺海。ROV 潛水器在如此深度的操作費用極高、時間極長。深海斷纜往往需要數週才能精確定位損壞點，修復可能需要 60 天以上。

Technical Escalation: Deep-Sea Cutting Capability

Analysts also point to a more alarming trend: China is developing active cutting technology targeting deep-sea cables. Traditional "accidental" methods mainly occur in shallow water (within 200 meters), because deep-sea cables are difficult to reach through normal fishing operations.

But according to research reports, Chinese naval research institutes have obtained patents for deep-sea operational equipment capable of cutting cables at greater depths — locations far from any plausible fishing or commercial sailing needs. This means the cover story of "pretending it's an accident" is expanding into deep-sea environments that previously offered almost no plausible deniability.

Why Is Deep Water Harder to Monitor? Deep-sea cable damage (>1000m) is difficult to detect via satellite and far harder to repair than shallow-water breaks. ROV operations at such depths are extremely expensive and time-consuming. Locating the exact break point on a deep-sea cable can take weeks, and repair may require 60+ days.

為什麼這是完美的灰色地帶手段？

回顧上述威脅，我們可以看清一個令人不安的共同邏輯：海底電纜是攻擊效益極高、歸因難度極大的目標。

攻擊發生在深海，沒有目擊者
使用民用船隻偽裝，不構成明顯「武裝攻擊」
可以辯稱是漁業意外或錨碰
受害國難以即時蒐集證據，也缺乏法律手段追訴
效果可以在不觸發 NATO 第五條款或《聯合國憲章》第 51 條的情況下，對目標國施加巨大壓力

這正是為什麼台灣必須建立主動監測系統，而不是被動等待事件發生後才回應。下一篇將探討台灣現有的執法框架，以及面對這些挑戰時的制度困境。

Why This Is the Perfect Gray Zone Tactic

Looking across these threats, a disturbing common logic emerges: submarine cables are targets with extremely high attack payoff and extremely difficult attribution.

Attacks occur on the deep seabed, with no witnesses
Civilian vessel disguise means no obvious "armed attack"
Fishing accident or anchor strike can be claimed as cover
Victim nations struggle to collect real-time evidence and lack legal means to prosecute
Effects can impose enormous pressure on a target country without triggering NATO Article 5 or UN Charter Article 51

This is exactly why Taiwan must build a proactive monitoring system rather than waiting to react after incidents occur. The next article explores Taiwan's existing enforcement framework, and the institutional challenges it faces.

錨拖 vs 蓄意破壞：如何區分？

幾乎所有海纜破壞案的爭點都是同一個：這是意外的錨拖，還是蓄意的破壞？由於兩者在物理結果上可能一模一樣（船錨在海床上拖過、勾斷電纜），單看「斷了一條纜」幾乎無法證明意圖。可疑與否，藏在行為模式裡。

✅ 較像意外

事發時段 AIS 正常開啟、航跡連續。
遭遇惡劣天候、走錨或機械故障的合理情境。
只勾到一條電纜，且非反覆經過。
事後配合通報、可被聯繫與調查。

⚠️ 較可疑

接近電纜前關閉或假造 AIS（走暗）。
在電纜上方異常低速、之字形或反覆來回。
短期內多條電纜相繼受損。
涉案船有身分變更、權宜旗或制裁紀錄。

沒有任何單一指標能「證明」蓄意——但當多項警訊同時出現，可否認性就會被削弱。這正是本站威脅評分的設計邏輯：不對單一事件下定論，而是累積行為證據，把最值得追查的少數排到前面。

Anchor Dragging vs Deliberate Sabotage: How to Tell Them Apart

Almost every cable-damage case hinges on the same question: was it an accidental anchor drag or deliberate sabotage? Because the physical result can be identical (an anchor dragging across the seabed and snagging a cable), "a cable broke" alone proves almost nothing about intent. Whether it is suspicious is hidden in the pattern of behavior.

✅ More like an accident

AIS was on and continuous through the event.
A plausible context: heavy weather, a dragging anchor, or mechanical failure.
Only one cable snagged, with no repeated passes.
The vessel cooperates afterward and can be contacted and investigated.

⚠️ More suspicious

AIS was switched off or spoofed before nearing the cable (going dark).
Abnormally slow, zigzag, or back-and-forth movement over the cable.
Multiple cables damaged in quick succession.
The vessel has identity changes, a flag of convenience, or a sanctions record.

No single indicator can "prove" intent — but when several red flags coincide, deniability erodes. That is the logic behind this site's threat scoring: not to rule on any one event, but to accumulate behavioral evidence and surface the few most worth investigating.

常見問題 FAQ

海底電纜最大的威脅來源是什麼？

統計上 41% 來自漁船拖網、16% 來自船錨，多為意外；但灰色地帶蓄意破壞最難追責，是本站監測的核心關切。

怎麼分辨意外與蓄意破壞？

蓄意破壞常偽裝成意外——使用民用漁船或貨船、選在深夜或深海，並在行動前關閉 AIS，使其難以與真正的意外區分。

什麼是「影子船隊」？

指旗籍不明或頻繁更換、所有人結構複雜、AIS 記錄異常的船隊，最初用於規避俄羅斯石油制裁，近年也出現在海底電纜附近。

中國有切斷深海電纜的能力嗎？

據研究報告，中國研究機構已取得深海切割裝備專利，可在遠離正常漁業需求的深海切斷電纜，擴大了「假裝意外」的操作空間。

FAQ

What is the biggest source of cable threats?

Statistically 41% come from fishing trawls and 16% from anchors, mostly accidental — but deliberate gray zone sabotage is the hardest to attribute and the core of our monitoring.

How can you tell an accident from deliberate sabotage?

Deliberate sabotage is disguised as an accident — using civilian fishing or cargo vessels, acting at night or in deep water, and disabling AIS beforehand to blur the line.

What is a "shadow fleet"?

Vessels with unclear or frequently-changed flags, complex ownership, and anomalous AIS records — first used to evade Russian oil sanctions, and increasingly seen near submarine cables.

Does China have deep-sea cable-cutting capability?

According to research, Chinese institutes hold patents for deep-sea cutting equipment able to sever cables far from any plausible fishing need — expanding the "pretend it's an accident" playbook.

參考資料 Sources

本頁概念可對照以下公開、權威來源核實：

本頁為研究與教育用途；偵測訊號為待查線索，非法律或事實認定。詳見方法論。

Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

This page is for research and education; detection signals are leads to investigate, not legal or factual findings. See the methodology.

🛰️ 台灣灰色地帶與海底電纜監測