🛰️ 台灣灰色地帶與海底電纜監測

灰色地帶監測 深度文章

海底電纜的
國際法保護

Submarine Cables
Under International Law

海洋法專區 02 • 1884 公約 • UNCLOS • 船旗國管轄

Law of the Sea 02 • 1884 Convention • UNCLOS • Flag-State Jurisdiction

本頁重點

In short

海底電纜的國際法保護有一條清楚的演進線：1884 年《保護海底電纜公約》→ 1958 年《公海公約》→ 1982 年 UNCLOS。其中 1884 年公約最有牙齒（甚至允許受害國補充管轄與軍艦查核），但締約方少、台海雙方皆非締約國；UNCLOS 第 113 條雖要求各國立法處罰斷纜，卻只分配了立法管轄，沒有給各國在公海上對外籍船的執行管轄。再加上 Lotus 案以來、由第 92 條成文化的船旗國專屬管轄，受害國經常落入「有法律、卻動不了那艘船」的窘境。

Cable protection in international law has a clear evolutionary line: the 1884 Convention → the 1958 High Seas Convention → 1982 UNCLOS. The 1884 Convention has the most teeth (even allowing supplementary jurisdiction by the victim state and warship inspection), but has few parties and neither side of the Taiwan Strait is one. UNCLOS Art. 113 requires states to legislate against cable damage but only allocates prescriptive jurisdiction, not enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships on the high seas. Combined with exclusive flag-state jurisdiction (from the Lotus case, codified in Art. 92), the victim state is often left with "a law but no power to touch the ship."

海洋法專區 SERIES → 海洋權益Maritime Rights 國際法保護Int'l Law 執法管轄Enforcement 台灣海纜現況TW Cables 全球海纜產業Global Cables
1884 年，電報剛把世界連成一張網。各國在巴黎坐下來，簽署了人類第一份專門保護海底電纜的國際公約。

140 年後，光纖取代了電報，纜線承載的不再是摩斯密碼而是整個數位文明。然而當一艘船在台灣外海拖斷電纜時，我們手上能用的國際法，竟然還停留在那場 19 世紀的會議所留下的框架——而且漏洞依舊。

三階段演進：保護越來越廣，牙齒越來越少

海底電纜的國際法保護不是一蹴可幾，而是經過三個階段逐步形成。有趣的是，保護的「範圍」越來越廣，但條文的「牙齒」反而越來越鈍。

In 1884, the telegraph had just woven the world into a single web. States sat down in Paris and signed humanity's first treaty dedicated to protecting submarine cables.

A hundred and forty years later, fiber has replaced the telegraph, and the cables carry not Morse code but an entire digital civilization. Yet when a ship drags a cable apart off Taiwan, the international law in our hands still rests on the framework left by that 19th-century conference — gaps and all.

Three Stages: Ever Broader Protection, Ever Fewer Teeth

Cable protection in international law did not arrive all at once; it formed over three stages. The curious part is that the scope of protection kept widening while the teeth of the text grew duller.

1884 · 保護海底電纜公約（巴黎）
最早、也最有牙齒的專門公約
第 2 條：故意或過失損壞海纜為應受處罰之行為。第 8 條：由船旗國管轄，但船旗國未履行時，受害國可行使「補充管轄」。第 10 條：軍艦對涉嫌船舶有查核（要求出示船籍文件）的權力。香港曾以《海底電報條例》、日本以國內法落實。問題：締約方僅約 36 國，台灣與中華人民共和國皆非締約方。
1958 · 公海公約（日內瓦）
把海纜保護納入海洋法體系
第 27 條要求締約國立法，把損壞公海海底電纜訂為可罰行為——實質上把 1884 年公約的精神搬進了現代海洋法的母體，但同樣把執行交回船旗國。它是 1884 與 UNCLOS 之間的橋。
1982 · UNCLOS（聯合國海洋法公約）
最普世、卻最缺執行力
第 112–115 條處理海纜：第 112 條承認鋪設自由；第 113 條要求各國立法處罰故意或重大過失斷纜；第 114、115 條處理纜線之間及與船舶間的損害賠償。第 58、79、87 條則保障在 EEZ 與公海鋪設電纜的自由。UNCLOS 幾乎是普世公約，卻把最關鍵的「在公海上對外籍船執法」留給了船旗國。
1884 · Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables (Paris)
The earliest — and most toothed — dedicated treaty
Art. 2: intentional or negligent damage to a cable is a punishable act. Art. 8: jurisdiction lies with the flag state, but where the flag state fails to act, the victim state may exercise "supplementary jurisdiction." Art. 10: warships may inspect (demand ship's papers from) suspect vessels. Hong Kong implemented it via the Submarine Telegraph Ordinance, Japan via domestic law. The catch: only ~36 states are parties, and neither Taiwan nor the PRC is one.
1958 · Convention on the High Seas (Geneva)
Folding cable protection into the law of the sea
Art. 27 requires parties to legislate to make damaging high-seas cables a punishable act — essentially carrying the spirit of the 1884 Convention into the body of modern law of the sea, but again handing enforcement back to the flag state. It is the bridge between 1884 and UNCLOS.
1982 · UNCLOS
The most universal — and least enforceable
Arts. 112-115 address cables: Art. 112 recognizes the freedom to lay them; Art. 113 requires states to legislate against intentional or grossly negligent damage; Arts. 114-115 deal with damage between cables and with ships. Arts. 58, 79, and 87 secure the freedom to lay cables in the EEZ and on the high seas. UNCLOS is nearly universal, yet leaves the crucial act — enforcing against foreign ships on the high seas — to the flag state.

致命缺口：立法管轄 ≠ 執行管轄

要理解國際法為什麼「看似有保護、實則使不上力」，必須掌握一組關鍵區分：立法管轄與執行管轄。

兩種管轄立法管轄（prescriptive）＝制定法律、宣告某行為違法的權力。
執行管轄（enforcement）＝實際登船、查扣、逮捕、追訴的權力。
UNCLOS 第 113 條只給了前者，沒給後者。
🔴 缺口一：第 113 條只課立法義務
第 113 條要求各國「制定法律」處罰斷纜，但這只是要求國家把規則寫進國內法。它沒有同時授權任何國家在公海上對外籍船舶登船、攔截或逮捕。也就是說，國家被要求「立法」，卻沒被授予「執法」的手段。
🔴 缺口二：船旗國專屬管轄（第 92、97 條）
承襲常設國際法院 1927 年 Lotus 號案所確立、並由 UNCLOS 第 92 條成文化的原則：公海上的船舶原則上只受船旗國專屬管轄；第 97 條更規定，因航行事故涉及刑責時，僅船旗國或當事人國籍國可追訴。結果，受害國想動手，第一道牆就是「那不是你的船」。

兩道缺口疊在一起，形成灰色地帶最愛利用的結構：把船掛上權宜旗、在公海或外海下手、事後讓船旗國「不配合」。國際法的文字俱在，執行的鑰匙卻不在受害國手裡。

The Fatal Gap: Prescriptive ≠ Enforcement Jurisdiction

To see why international law "looks protective but cannot bite," you need one key distinction: prescriptive jurisdiction versus enforcement jurisdiction.

Two JurisdictionsPrescriptive = the power to make law and declare an act illegal.
Enforcement = the power to actually board, seize, arrest, and prosecute.
UNCLOS Art. 113 grants only the former, not the latter.
🔴 Gap 1: Art. 113 only imposes a duty to legislate
Art. 113 requires states to "adopt laws" punishing cable damage, but that merely asks states to write rules into domestic law. It does not authorize any state to board, intercept, or arrest a foreign ship on the high seas. States are told to legislate, but handed no means to enforce.
🔴 Gap 2: Exclusive flag-state jurisdiction (Arts. 92, 97)
Following the principle established by the Permanent Court's 1927 Lotus case and codified in UNCLOS Art. 92, ships on the high seas are in principle subject only to their flag state; Art. 97 further provides that for penal matters arising from a navigational incident, only the flag state or the state of the person's nationality may prosecute. So the victim state's first wall is: "that is not your ship."

Stacked together, these two gaps form the structure the gray zone loves to exploit: fly a flag of convenience, act on the high seas or in distant waters, then have the flag state "decline to cooperate." The words of international law are all there; the key to enforcement is not in the victim state's hands.

對台灣的意義

把這套框架放回台海，結論並不樂觀：

📜
最有牙齒的 1884 公約用不上台灣與中華人民共和國都不是 1884 年公約締約方，那套「受害國補充管轄＋軍艦查核」的強力工具，在台海情境無法直接援引。
⚖️
UNCLOS 的義務台灣已先行立法台灣雖非 UNCLOS 締約方，但已透過電信管理法等國內法落實第 113 條的「立法義務」。問題從來不在「有沒有法」，而在「能不能對那艘外籍船執法」。
🏴
船旗國管轄是最難跨越的牆破壞者掛權宜旗、在外海下手，台灣縱有完備國內法，仍受制於公海船旗國專屬管轄的國際法框架。

那麼，國家手上還剩下哪些執法工具？緊追權、登臨權、沿岸國保護權，以及把普遍管轄權往海纜延伸的學理芻議——這些屬於「執行管轄」的縫隙，是下一篇〈誰能登船執法？〉要處理的問題。

What It Means for Taiwan

Placed back into the Taiwan Strait, the conclusion is not encouraging:

📜
The toothiest 1884 Convention is unusableNeither Taiwan nor the PRC is a party to the 1884 Convention, so its powerful toolkit — victim-state supplementary jurisdiction plus warship inspection — cannot be directly invoked in the Strait.
⚖️
Taiwan has already legislated UNCLOS's dutyThough not a UNCLOS party, Taiwan has implemented the Art. 113 "duty to legislate" through domestic laws such as the Telecommunications Management Act. The problem was never "is there a law" but "can you enforce against that foreign ship."
🏴
Flag-state jurisdiction is the hardest wallWhen perpetrators fly a flag of convenience and act in distant waters, even Taiwan's complete domestic law remains constrained by the international framework of exclusive high-seas flag-state jurisdiction.

So which enforcement tools remain? Hot pursuit, the right of visit, the coastal state's protective powers, and the scholarly proposal to extend universal jurisdiction to cables — these "enforcement-jurisdiction" cracks are the subject of the next article, Who Can Board and Enforce?

常見問題 FAQ

1884 年公約如何保護海底電纜？
1884 年《保護海底電纜公約》是最早專門保護海纜的國際條約。第 2 條將故意或過失損壞海纜訂為應受處罰的行為；第 8 條規定可由船旗國管轄，並在船旗國未履行時允許受害國行使補充管轄；第 10 條更賦予軍艦對涉嫌船舶的查核權。它在理論上比 UNCLOS 更有牙齒，但締約方僅約 36 國，台灣與中華人民共和國皆非締約方，因此在台海情境難以直接適用。
UNCLOS 第 113 條規定了什麼？
UNCLOS 第 113 條要求各締約國制定國內法，把故意或重大過失損壞公海海底電纜的行為訂為可罰的犯罪。它課予國家「立法義務」，但只分配了立法管轄，沒有同時賦予各國在公海上對外籍船舶的執行管轄——這正是國際法保護海纜的核心缺口。
什麼是「立法管轄」與「執行管轄」的缺口？
立法管轄（prescriptive jurisdiction）是制定法律、宣告某行為違法的權力；執行管轄（enforcement jurisdiction）是實際登船、查扣、逮捕、追訴的權力。UNCLOS 第 113 條要求各國立法處罰斷纜，卻依第 92、97 條把公海船舶交給船旗國專屬管轄。結果是：受害國有法律、卻沒有對外籍船動手的權力，形成「有法卻無從執行」的缺口。
為什麼船旗國管轄成為最大的制度漏洞？
依據常設國際法院 1927 年 Lotus 案以降確立、並由 UNCLOS 第 92 條成文化的原則，公海上的船舶原則上只受其船旗國專屬管轄。破壞者只要把船登記在管理寬鬆的權宜旗國，受害國便無權登船或追訴，必須仰賴船旗國配合——而這些船旗國往往缺乏意願或能力，使保護形同虛設。

FAQ

How does the 1884 Convention protect submarine cables?
The 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables is the earliest treaty dedicated to cables. Art. 2 makes intentional or negligent damage punishable; Art. 8 assigns jurisdiction to the flag state and allows the victim state to exercise supplementary jurisdiction where the flag state fails to act; Art. 10 gives warships a right to inspect suspect vessels. It is in theory more toothed than UNCLOS, but has only ~36 parties — and neither Taiwan nor the PRC is one — so it is hard to apply directly in the Strait.
What does UNCLOS Article 113 provide?
UNCLOS Art. 113 requires each party to enact domestic law making intentional or grossly negligent damage to high-seas submarine cables a punishable offense. It imposes a "duty to legislate" but allocates only prescriptive jurisdiction — it does not also grant states enforcement jurisdiction over foreign ships on the high seas. That is the core gap in international cable protection.
What is the "prescriptive vs enforcement" jurisdiction gap?
Prescriptive jurisdiction is the power to make law and declare conduct illegal; enforcement jurisdiction is the power to actually board, seize, arrest, and prosecute. UNCLOS Art. 113 requires states to legislate against cable damage, yet Arts. 92 and 97 hand high-seas ships to exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. The result: the victim state has a law but no power to act against the foreign ship — a "law without enforcement" gap.
Why is flag-state jurisdiction the biggest institutional gap?
Under the principle established from the Permanent Court's 1927 Lotus case and codified in UNCLOS Art. 92, a ship on the high seas is in principle subject only to its flag state. If perpetrators register under a loosely regulated flag of convenience, the victim state has no power to board or prosecute and must rely on the flag state's cooperation — which is often unwilling or unable, rendering protection hollow.
← 01 海洋權益 ← 01 Maritime Rights 下一篇：誰能登船執法？ → Next: Who Can Board and Enforce? →

參考資料 Sources

本頁概念可對照以下公開、權威來源核實：

本文公約演進與管轄缺口分析，參酌李謁霏〈《海洋基本法》的法律構造·第十二講：海洋權益〉，《當代法律》2025 年 3 月號。

本頁為研究與教育用途；偵測訊號為待查線索，非法律或事實認定。詳見 方法論。

Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

The convention timeline and jurisdiction-gap analysis draw on Li Yefei, "The Legal Structure of the Ocean Basic Act, Lecture 12: Maritime Rights," Contemporary Law Journal, March 2025.

This page is for research and education; detection signals are leads to investigate, not legal or factual findings. See the methodology.

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