🛰️ 台灣灰色地帶與海底電纜監測

灰色地帶監測 深度文章

台灣海纜
基礎設施現況

Taiwan's Submarine
Cable Infrastructure

海洋法專區 04 • 四大登陸站 • 12 條國際海纜 • 外島備援

Law of the Sea 04 • 4 Landing Stations • 12 Cable Systems • Outer-Island Redundancy

本頁重點

In short

台灣本島的國際海纜高度集中於四個登陸站——北部的頭城、淡水、八里，南部的枋山——共承載約 12 條登陸國際海纜系統。本島合計約 14 條國際海纜、約 10 條國內海纜（連接外島）。連通兩岸的金廈海纜（約 21 公里）與淡福海纜 TSE（約 260 公里）具地緣敏感性。最脆弱的是外島：馬祖僅 2 條、金門僅 1+1 條備援，一旦同時受損可能斷網數十天。登陸站集中與外島單薄的備援，是台灣海纜韌性的兩大結構弱點。

Taiwan's international cables are heavily concentrated at four landing stations — Toucheng, Tamsui, and Bali in the north, Fangshan in the south — carrying roughly 12 international cable systems that land on the main island. The island has about 14 international cables in total plus ~10 domestic cables connecting the outer islands. The cross-strait Kinmen–Xiamen cable (~21 km) and Tamsui–Fuzhou (TSE, ~260 km) are geopolitically sensitive. Most fragile are the outer islands: Matsu has only 2 cables and Kinmen just 1+1 backup, so simultaneous damage can mean weeks offline. Landing-station concentration and thin outer-island redundancy are Taiwan's two structural weaknesses.

海洋法專區 SERIES → 海洋權益Maritime Rights 國際法保護Int'l Law 執法管轄Enforcement 台灣海纜現況TW Cables 全球海纜產業Global Cables
打開海纜地圖，你會看到一束束細線從台灣的海岸延伸出去，潛入太平洋與台灣海峽。它們的起點並不分散——而是擠在島嶼周邊屈指可數的幾個「上岸口」。

這些上岸口，就是登陸站。理解台灣海纜的脆弱，要先理解這幅實體地理。

海纜不是抽象的線，而是有實體地理的設施

我們常把海底電纜想成地圖上的一條線，但它其實是一套有明確實體地理的基礎設施：深海纜線從外海一路鋪到岸邊，在特定地點「上岸」，進入登陸站（landing station），再透過陸地骨幹網路（backhaul）連到城市的網路機房與資料中心（IDC）。

對台灣而言，這套地理高度集中——而集中，正是風險所在。

Open a cable map and you see bundles of thin lines reaching out from Taiwan's coast into the Pacific and the Strait. Their starting points are not spread out — they crowd into a handful of "landfall" spots around the island.

Those landfalls are the landing stations. To understand Taiwan's cable fragility, first understand this physical geography.

A Cable Is Not an Abstract Line but a Physical Facility

We tend to picture a submarine cable as a line on a map, but it is infrastructure with a very concrete physical geography: deep-sea cable is laid all the way from the open sea to the shore, makes landfall at specific points, enters a landing station, and is then carried by terrestrial backhaul to a city's network hubs and data centers (IDCs).

For Taiwan, this geography is highly concentrated — and concentration is precisely where the risk lies.

四大登陸站

台灣本島的國際海纜，主要集中在四個登陸站：

北部 · 頭城（宜蘭）
面向太平洋的主要門戶
位於東北角，是多條連往美國、日本、東南亞之太平洋方向國際海纜的登陸點，承載大量對美對日流量。
北部 · 淡水（新北）
老牌登陸站，含兩岸海纜
歷史悠久的登陸站之一，亦為淡福海纜（TSE，淡水—福州）等海纜的登陸點。
北部 · 八里（新北）
北台灣的另一上岸口
與淡水、頭城共同構成北台灣的國際海纜登陸群，分擔北部對外流量。
南部 · 枋山（屏東）
南台灣面向東南亞的門戶
南部主要登陸站，是多條連往東南亞、南亞方向國際海纜的登陸點，與北部登陸群形成南北分流。
為什麼「集中」是風險四個登陸站承載絕大多數國際流量。登陸站、上岸段與淺水區是海纜最脆弱、也最容易被定位的環節——把雞蛋放在少數幾個籃子裡，灰色地帶威脅只要鎖定其中關鍵幾段，影響就可能被放大。

The Four Landing Stations

Taiwan's international cables land mainly at four stations:

North · Toucheng (Yilan)
The main gateway facing the Pacific
On the northeast corner, the landfall for many Pacific-facing international cables toward the US, Japan, and Southeast Asia, carrying heavy US- and Japan-bound traffic.
North · Tamsui (New Taipei)
A veteran station, including cross-strait cable
One of the oldest landing stations, and the landfall for cables such as the Tamsui–Fuzhou (TSE) system.
North · Bali (New Taipei)
Northern Taiwan's other landfall
Together with Tamsui and Toucheng, it forms the northern cluster of international cable landings, sharing the north's external traffic.
South · Fangshan (Pingtung)
The south's gateway toward Southeast Asia
The main southern station, the landfall for many cables toward Southeast and South Asia, splitting traffic north–south with the northern cluster.
Why "Concentration" Is the RiskFour landing stations carry the overwhelming majority of international traffic. Landing stations, landfall segments, and shallow water are the most fragile and the most easily located parts of a cable — putting the eggs in a few baskets means a gray-zone threat only has to target a few key segments to amplify its impact.

數字裡的台灣海纜

14本島國際海纜系統（約）
12登陸本島之國際海纜（約）
10國內／外島海纜（約）
4主要登陸站

兩岸海纜：金廈與淡福

除了面向太平洋與東南亞的國際海纜，台灣周邊還有幾條地緣政治上特別敏感的兩岸海纜：

金廈海纜 · 約 21 公里
金門 ↔ 廈門
連接金門與中國廈門的短程海纜，距離極短，反映金門在地理與通訊上「離中國比離台灣本島更近」的特殊處境。
淡福海纜 TSE · 約 260 公里
淡水（Tamsui）↔ 福州（Fuzhou）
連通台灣淡水與中國福州的海纜系統，距離約 260 公里，是兩岸通訊的歷史性連結之一。

Taiwan's Cables in Numbers

14Int'l cable systems, main island (approx.)
12Int'l cables landing on the main island (approx.)
10Domestic / outer-island cables (approx.)
4Main landing stations

Cross-Strait Cables: Kinmen–Xiamen and Tamsui–Fuzhou

Beyond the international cables facing the Pacific and Southeast Asia, a few geopolitically sensitive cross-strait cables run near Taiwan:

Kinmen–Xiamen · ~21 km
Kinmen ↔ Xiamen
A short cable linking Kinmen to Xiamen in China — extremely short, reflecting Kinmen's peculiar situation of being geographically and telecommunications-wise "closer to China than to Taiwan's main island."
Tamsui–Fuzhou (TSE) · ~260 km
Tamsui ↔ Fuzhou
A cable system connecting Tamsui in Taiwan to Fuzhou in China, about 260 km long — one of the historical cross-strait communication links.

最脆弱的環節：外島備援

本島雖有十餘條國際海纜可互為備援，但外島的處境截然不同。

  • 馬祖：僅靠 2 條海纜對台灣本島聯外。2023 年 2 月，兩條海纜在 6 天內相繼中斷，約 1.4 萬居民網路受影響近 50 天。
  • 金門：僅 1 條加 1 條備援，冗餘極低。
  • 修復不易：全球專業修纜船僅約 60 艘，常需排隊；外島一斷，往往得等上 1 至 1.5 個月。

外島的脆弱不只是民生問題，更是國安問題：當一座島的對外連線可以被少數幾條海纜「一刀切斷」，它就成為灰色地帶施壓最廉價的著力點。這也是為什麼，本島雖較有韌性，仍須正視登陸站集中與外島備援單薄這兩大結構弱點。下一篇〈全球海纜產業與斷纜風險〉，將把鏡頭拉遠，看看台灣的處境在全球海纜版圖中的位置。

The Most Fragile Link: Outer-Island Redundancy

The main island has a dozen-plus international cables that can back each other up, but the outer islands are in a very different situation.

  • Matsu: relies on just 2 cables to the main island. In February 2023 both were cut within 6 days, affecting ~14,000 residents' internet for nearly 50 days.
  • Kinmen: only 1 cable plus 1 backup — extremely low redundancy.
  • Hard to repair: only ~60 specialized cable-repair ships worldwide, often queued; an outer-island break typically waits 1 to 1.5 months.

Outer-island fragility is not just a livelihood issue but a national-security one: when an island's external connectivity can be "cut with one stroke" via a few cables, it becomes the cheapest pressure point for gray-zone coercion. That is why, although the main island is more resilient, the two structural weaknesses — landing-station concentration and thin outer-island redundancy — must be taken seriously. The next article, The Global Submarine Cable Industry, pulls the lens back to place Taiwan's situation on the global cable map.

常見問題 FAQ

台灣的海纜登陸站有哪些？
台灣本島的國際海底電纜主要集中在四個登陸站：北部的頭城、淡水、八里，以及南部的枋山。國際海纜在這些登陸站上岸後，再透過陸地的骨幹網路（backhaul）連到台北、內湖等網路機房與資料中心。登陸站高度集中，是台灣海纜韌性的結構性弱點之一。
台灣有多少條海底電纜？
台灣本島約有 14 條國際海底電纜系統，以及約 10 條國內海纜（連接澎湖、金門、馬祖等外島）。其中登陸台灣本島的國際海纜系統約 12 條，分布在頭城、淡水、八里、枋山四個登陸站。外島的海纜數量則極少，是最脆弱的環節。
金廈海纜與淡福海纜是什麼？
金廈海纜是連接金門與中國廈門的短程海纜，長度約 21 公里，反映金門在地理與通訊上的特殊處境。淡福海纜（TSE，Tanshui–Fuzhou，淡水—福州）則是一條約 260 公里的海纜系統。這些連通兩岸的海纜，在地緣政治上具有敏感性。
為什麼外島的海纜備援特別脆弱？
外島如馬祖僅靠 2 條海纜對台灣本島聯外，金門也僅有 1 條加 1 條備援。一旦這少數幾條海纜同時受損，整座島嶼可能在數十天內無法正常對外連線——2023 年 2 月馬祖兩條海纜在 6 天內相繼中斷、約 1.4 萬居民網路受影響近 50 天，正是這種脆弱性的寫照。本島雖有較多備援，但登陸站集中仍構成隱憂。

FAQ

What are Taiwan's cable landing stations?
Taiwan's international cables land mainly at four stations: Toucheng, Tamsui, and Bali in the north, and Fangshan in the south. After landfall, cables are carried by terrestrial backhaul to network hubs and data centers in places like Taipei and Neihu. The heavy concentration of landing stations is one of Taiwan's structural cable-resilience weaknesses.
How many submarine cables does Taiwan have?
Taiwan's main island has about 14 international submarine cable systems plus roughly 10 domestic cables (connecting outer islands such as Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu). About 12 international cable systems land on the main island across the four stations of Toucheng, Tamsui, Bali, and Fangshan. The outer islands have very few cables and are the most fragile link.
What are the Kinmen–Xiamen and Tamsui–Fuzhou cables?
The Kinmen–Xiamen cable is a short cable (~21 km) linking Kinmen to Xiamen in China, reflecting Kinmen's peculiar geographic and communications situation. The Tamsui–Fuzhou cable (TSE) is a system about 260 km long. These cross-strait cables are geopolitically sensitive.
Why is outer-island cable redundancy especially fragile?
Outer islands such as Matsu rely on just 2 cables to the main island, and Kinmen has only 1 plus 1 backup. If those few cables are damaged together, an entire island can be cut off for weeks — in February 2023 Matsu's two cables were cut within 6 days and ~14,000 residents' internet was affected for nearly 50 days. The main island has more redundancy, but landing-station concentration remains a concern.
← 03 執法管轄 ← 03 Enforcement 下一篇：全球海纜產業與斷纜風險 → Next: The Global Cable Industry →

參考資料 Sources

本頁概念可對照以下公開、權威來源核實：

本文登陸站、12 條登陸海纜與兩岸海纜概況，參酌 Vincent Chen-WS〈台灣海纜概況及備援機制〉（Medium, 2018）及公開海纜地圖資料；外島事件數據見公開新聞報導。

本頁為研究與教育用途；數據為公開資料彙整，海纜條數與長度可能隨新建／退役而變動。詳見 方法論。

Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

The landing stations, ~12 landing systems, and cross-strait cable overview draw on Vincent Chen-WS, "Overview of Taiwan's Submarine Cables and Backup Mechanisms" (Medium, 2018) and public cable-map data; outer-island incident figures are from public news reporting.

This page is for research and education; figures aggregate public data, and cable counts and lengths can change as systems are built or retired. See the methodology.

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