🛰️ Taiwan Gray Zone & Submarine Cable Monitor

Gray Zone Monitor Articles 中

Taiwan's Enforcement Framework
and Challenges

Article Series 05 • Legal Framework • Flag-State Jurisdiction • International Cooperation

SERIES → 01 Submarine Cable 02 AIS 03 Taiwan Status 04 Threats 05 Enforcement 06 Methodology
On January 11, 2025, Taiwan's Coast Guard received a report and raced to Taiwan's northeastern waters — the cable was already cut, and the suspect vessel had vanished.

Coast Guard personnel stared at an empty sea, holding no detention warrant, no jurisdiction, not even confirmed knowledge of which flag state the vessel belonged to. This wasn't an enforcement failure; it was a systemic trap.

Taiwan's Legal Toolbox

Before 2023, Taiwan's legal protection for submarine cables was almost non-existent. The 2023 amendment to Article 72 of the Telecommunications Management Act was an important legislative advance, but still faces deep jurisdictional constraints.

Telecommunications Management Act Art. 72 (2023 Amendment)
Criminal Liability for Submarine Cable Damage
Anyone who intentionally damages or destroys a submarine cable or pipeline, causing harm to the public, shall be punished by imprisonment of up to 3 years, detention, or a fine of up to NT$2 million. Penalties are elevated for severe damage.

Significance: This is the first time Taiwan explicitly designated submarine cable damage as a criminal offense, providing a concrete basis for criminal prosecution.
ROC Criminal Code / Other Applicable Provisions
Pre-existing General Provisions
Criminal Code property destruction provisions and Telecommunications Act clauses could previously apply, but lacked specific provisions for "damage on the high seas by foreign vessels" — leaving a large legal gray zone.

The Biggest Institutional Gap: Flag-State Jurisdiction

No matter how robust Taiwan's domestic law becomes, it cannot overcome a fundamental barrier of international law: Flag-State Jurisdiction.

🔴 Core Dilemma: UNCLOS Art. 92 / Art. 94
Under UNCLOS, vessels sailing on the high seas are under the exclusive jurisdiction of their flag state. This means:
  • Taiwan's Coast Guard cannot forcibly board foreign vessels on the high seas (unless there's clear evidence of current criminal activity)
  • Even when a vessel is confirmed to have cut a cable, prosecution rights rest with the flag state, not Taiwan
  • If the flag state is Tanzania, Togo, or similar countries but the vessel is effectively controlled by China — those countries will almost certainly not cooperate with prosecution
  • Taiwan's diplomatic status makes pushing for international criminal justice cooperation even harder
🔴 Institutional Gap: 1884 Paris International Submarine Telegraph Convention
The 1884 Paris Convention is the only international treaty specifically protecting submarine cables. It designates cable damage as a prosecutable offense and allows coastal state jurisdiction regardless of vessel nationality.

The problem: Taiwan is not a party to any international treaties (due to its diplomatic status), and the PRC refuses to recognize the convention as binding on it. In other words, this 19th-century convention is effectively inapplicable in the Taiwan Strait context.

Real Case Study: Why Perpetrators Almost Never Face Prosecution

Xing Shun 39 Prosecution Barrier Analysis
  1. Flag issue: Vessel flagged in Tanzania; Taiwan cannot directly demand Tanzania cooperate in prosecution
  2. Owner concealment: Real owner hidden through multiple shell companies; legal responsibility is hard to pinpoint
  3. Scene evidence: Damage occurred 4,000 meters underwater; real-time evidence collection is impossible
  4. Jurisdiction gap: Taiwan's legal basis for asserting jurisdiction lacks international support
  5. Diplomatic channels: Taiwan lacks formal diplomatic channels to submit legally binding prosecution demands to China
Result: Taiwan issued a verbal protest. The vessel continued sailing.

This is not an isolated case. Since the 2023 Matsu incident, no perpetrator in any case of suspected Taiwan submarine cable sabotage has faced substantive judicial prosecution.

96 Blacklisted Vessels and International Responses

Facing the shadow fleet threat, Taiwan and its partners have begun taking more active non-judicial countermeasures.

Taiwan — Blacklist System
Taiwan's Coast Guard and related agencies have established a suspicious vessel blacklist, currently listing over 96 vessels with anomalous behavioral records, banning them from Taiwan's ports or restricting their activities in Taiwan's waters.
G7 — Shadow Fleet Working Group
The 2024 G7 Summit prioritized shadow fleets, establishing a dedicated working group to coordinate intelligence sharing and coordinated sanctions. While Taiwan is not a G7 member, this framework offers potential multilateral cooperation opportunities.
IMO — Resolution A.1192(33)
The IMO's 2023 Resolution A.1192(33) calls on member states to strengthen controls on AIS manipulation and requires flag states to investigate vessels with AIS anomalies. While its binding power is limited, it establishes an international normative foundation.
ICPC — International Cable Protection Committee
Taiwan cooperates with ICPC through industry channels, sharing intelligence on cable damage incidents and participating in best-practice discussions. While not an enforcement body, ICPC plays an important role in building international awareness and behavioral standards.

Taiwan's Unique Dilemma

Most countries dealing with submarine cable security can rely on: formal diplomatic channels, bilateral Mutual Legal Assistance treaties (MLAs), Interpol cooperation, and the ability to raise issues at the UN Security Council. Taiwan effectively has access to none of these.

This creates a paradoxical situation: Taiwan is among the world's most dependent regions on submarine cables, yet has the least voice in the international legal frameworks designed to protect them.

The fundamental contradiction: Protecting submarine cables requires pre-incident deterrence, not just post-incident prosecution. When perpetrators know Taiwan can barely prosecute them, the cost of sabotaging cables is nearly zero. This is precisely why active monitoring, early warning, and making suspicious behavior visible to the international community has become one of Taiwan's most effective current defensive tools.

For in-depth legal analysis, see our research article: Submarine Cable Legal Protection Framework Analysis.

Recommended Directions

How Other Countries Are Responding to Cable Threats

Taiwan is not alone. Since 2023, a string of cable and gas-pipeline incidents in the Baltic Sea has pushed "undersea infrastructure protection" from a fringe topic to the core of national security in Europe. Taiwan can draw lessons from these responses.

🛡️
NATO steps up patrolsNATO launched a dedicated undersea-infrastructure patrol effort in the Baltic, combining ships, air surveillance, and uncrewed platforms to raise presence and deterrence in critical waters.
⚖️
Decisive boarding and detentionSome coastal states have boarded and even detained vessels suspected of dragging anchors across cables while behaving suspiciously — the publicly reported Eagle S case is one example — showing a will to do more than protest.
🔗
Intelligence sharing and shipping accountabilityCross-border data sharing targets shadow fleets and the insurance/flag-state chain, applying pressure at registration and insurance — not just chasing individual ships after the fact.

The common message: cable security cannot rest on after-the-fact repair or diplomatic protest alone; it needs continuous maritime awareness, fast-acting legal tools, and international cooperation advancing together. For Taiwan — on the front line and constrained by flag-state jurisdiction — strengthening open-source maritime monitoring and cross-border evidence chains is a comparatively practical place to start now.

FAQ

Does Taiwan have laws punishing cable cutting?
Yes. The 2023 amendment to Telecommunications Management Act Article 72 allows up to 3 years' imprisonment, detention, or a fine up to NT$2 million for intentionally damaging a cable.
Why are perpetrators rarely prosecuted?
Under UNCLOS Article 92, vessels on the high seas fall under exclusive flag-state jurisdiction. Taiwan can rarely board or prosecute foreign vessels, and owners often hide behind shell companies.
Does the 1884 Submarine Cable Convention protect Taiwan?
No. Taiwan is not a party due to its diplomatic status, and China rejects its binding force — rendering this 19th-century convention effectively inapplicable in the Taiwan Strait.
How is Taiwan responding?
By maintaining a blacklist of 96+ suspicious vessels, pursuing informal maritime cooperation with partners, engaging G7 shadow-fleet frameworks, and publishing suspicious AIS tracks to build international pressure.
← 04 Cable Threats Next: Our Methodology →

Sources

The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:

This page is for research and education; detection signals are leads to investigate, not legal or factual findings. See the methodology.

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