Law of the Sea 04 • 4 Landing Stations • 12 Cable Systems • Outer-Island Redundancy
Taiwan's international cables are heavily concentrated at four landing stations — Toucheng, Tamsui, and Bali in the north, Fangshan in the south — carrying roughly 12 international cable systems that land on the main island. The island has about 14 international cables in total plus ~10 domestic cables connecting the outer islands. The cross-strait Kinmen–Xiamen cable (~21 km) and Tamsui–Fuzhou (TSE, ~260 km) are geopolitically sensitive. Most fragile are the outer islands: Matsu has only 2 cables and Kinmen just 1+1 backup, so simultaneous damage can mean weeks offline. Landing-station concentration and thin outer-island redundancy are Taiwan's two structural weaknesses.
We tend to picture a submarine cable as a line on a map, but it is infrastructure with a very concrete physical geography: deep-sea cable is laid all the way from the open sea to the shore, makes landfall at specific points, enters a landing station, and is then carried by terrestrial backhaul to a city's network hubs and data centers (IDCs).
For Taiwan, this geography is highly concentrated — and concentration is precisely where the risk lies.
Taiwan's international cables land mainly at four stations:
Beyond the international cables facing the Pacific and Southeast Asia, a few geopolitically sensitive cross-strait cables run near Taiwan:
The main island has a dozen-plus international cables that can back each other up, but the outer islands are in a very different situation.
Outer-island fragility is not just a livelihood issue but a national-security one: when an island's external connectivity can be "cut with one stroke" via a few cables, it becomes the cheapest pressure point for gray-zone coercion. That is why, although the main island is more resilient, the two structural weaknesses — landing-station concentration and thin outer-island redundancy — must be taken seriously. The next article, The Global Submarine Cable Industry, pulls the lens back to place Taiwan's situation on the global cable map.
The concepts on this page can be verified against these public, authoritative sources:
The landing stations, ~12 landing systems, and cross-strait cable overview draw on Vincent Chen-WS, "Overview of Taiwan's Submarine Cables and Backup Mechanisms" (Medium, 2018) and public cable-map data; outer-island incident figures are from public news reporting.
This page is for research and education; figures aggregate public data, and cable counts and lengths can change as systems are built or retired. See the methodology.