開源衛星數據 • 即時船舶追蹤 • 海纜安全
Open Satellite Data • Real-time Vessel Tracking • Cable Security
「灰色地帶」是指介於和平與戰爭之間的模糊狀態。在台灣周邊海域，這包括：大量漁船越界作業、船隻關閉 AIS 定位訊號成為「暗船」、海上民兵偽裝為漁船活動，以及與軍事演習高度相關的異常船舶行為。
這些活動不構成傳統意義上的軍事衝突，卻持續侵蝕海上秩序、消耗監測資源，並可能為進一步行動創造條件。透過衛星與 AIS 數據的交叉比對，我們能追蹤這些隱蔽的海上活動。
The "gray zone" refers to the ambiguous space between peace and war. Around Taiwan, this includes: fishing fleets crossing maritime boundaries, vessels disabling AIS transponders to become "dark ships," maritime militia disguised as fishing boats, and anomalous vessel behavior closely correlated with military exercises.
These activities fall short of traditional military conflict but continuously erode maritime order, drain monitoring resources, and may create conditions for further action. By cross-referencing satellite imagery and AIS data, we can track these covert maritime activities.
台灣超過 95% 的對外網路通訊依賴海底電纜。這些電纜集中通過台灣海峽與周邊海域——正是灰色地帶活動最頻繁的區域。
拖網漁船的錨泊與作業是電纜損壞的主因之一。當大量不明船隻在電纜路線附近活動，便構成潛在威脅。本站地圖圖層可疊加顯示海底電纜路線與船隻分布，協助識別風險。
Over 95% of Taiwan's international internet traffic relies on submarine cables. These cables pass through the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters — precisely where gray zone activity is most intense.
Anchor dragging by fishing trawlers is a leading cause of cable damage. When unidentified vessels operate near cable routes, they pose a potential threat. Our map layers overlay submarine cable routes with vessel positions to help identify risks.
即時顯示船隻位置、暗船偵測、海底電纜路線與漁撈熱點
Real-time vessel positions, dark vessel detections, cable routes & fishing hotspots
SAR 衛星偵測無 AIS 訊號的船隻，按區域分析分布
SAR satellite detection of vessels without AIS, regional analysis
趨勢圖表、軍事演習預測指標、暗船與軍事活動相關性
Trend charts, military exercise prediction indicators & correlations
船位動態回放＋灰區事件、聚焦敘事、區域分析、走暗與匯出
Track playback + gray-zone events, focus narrative, area analysis, going-dark & export
依省份分析中國漁船在台灣周邊的活動分布
Chinese fishing vessel activity by province around Taiwan
偵測船隻變更名稱、呼號或 IMO 號碼等可疑行為
Detect vessels changing names, call signs, or IMO numbers
影子船隊灰色地帶威脅、UNCLOS 法律漏洞與國際合作框架
Shadow fleet gray zone threats, UNCLOS legal gaps & international cooperation
Start from the live monitoring map to see real-time vessel positions, dark-vessel detections, and submarine cable routes around Taiwan.
Use the layer controls to show or hide vessels, dark vessels, submarine cables, and fishing hotspots — focus on what matters to you.
In the sidebar or bottom panel, browse vessels ranked by threat score. Click any vessel to see its detailed risk indicators.
Open the AIS track animation to replay vessel paths over recent days and spot going-dark, loitering, or ship-to-ship behavior.
On the statistics page, review dark-vessel trend charts and military-exercise prediction indicators to read the overall picture.
暗船是指關閉 AIS（船舶自動識別系統）訊號、無法被一般船舶追蹤系統偵測的船隻。本站透過 SAR 合成孔徑雷達衛星影像偵測這些未發送 AIS 訊號的船隻，並與 AIS 數據交叉比對，找出刻意「走暗」的可疑目標。
船舶位置資料來自台灣港務局公開的 AIS 數據；暗船偵測來自 Global Fishing Watch 的 SAR 衛星影像；威脅評分方法則參考美國智庫 CSIS「Signals in the Swarm」報告的灰色地帶分析方法論。所有資料皆為開源公開資訊（OSINT）。
AIS 船舶資料每 2 小時自動更新一次；完整資料管線（含暗船偵測、威脅評分、軌跡分析）每 12 小時執行一次；統計報告每週彙整。所有時間以 UTC（協調世界時）標示。
本站採用 8 項指標的加權評分系統，包括：靠近海底電纜並低速徘徊、之字形異常航行、頻繁變更船名或呼號（身分操弄）、長時間關閉 AIS（走暗）、AIS 位置造假、海上旁靠（STS）等。分數達到門檻的船隻會被標記為可疑並列入清單。
台灣超過 95% 的對外網路通訊依賴海底電纜，這些電纜密集通過台灣海峽。拖網漁船的錨泊與作業是電纜損壞的主因之一；當不明船隻在電纜路線附近長時間徘徊，便構成基礎設施安全威脅。
不是。本站是獨立的開源情報（OSINT）專案，所有資料來自公開來源，分析方法與程式碼皆公開於 GitHub，不代表任何政府或官方機構立場。
A dark vessel is a ship that has switched off its AIS (Automatic Identification System) transponder so it cannot be tracked by ordinary vessel-tracking systems. This site detects them using SAR (synthetic aperture radar) satellite imagery and cross-references the detections against AIS data to surface targets that have deliberately "gone dark."
Vessel positions come from the Taiwan Port Bureau's public AIS feed; dark-vessel detections come from Global Fishing Watch SAR satellite imagery; and the threat-scoring methodology is based on the CSIS "Signals in the Swarm" report on gray-zone analysis. All sources are open-source intelligence (OSINT).
AIS vessel data refreshes every 2 hours; the full pipeline (dark-vessel detection, threat scoring, track analysis) runs every 12 hours; and statistical reports are compiled weekly. All timestamps are in UTC.
The site uses a weighted 8-criterion scoring system: loitering at low speed near submarine cables, zigzag navigation, frequent name/call-sign changes (identity manipulation), long AIS gaps (going dark), AIS position spoofing, ship-to-ship (STS) transfers, and more. Vessels that cross the score threshold are flagged and listed.
Over 95% of Taiwan's international internet traffic relies on submarine cables that pass densely through the Taiwan Strait. Anchor dragging by trawlers is a leading cause of cable damage, so unidentified vessels loitering near cable routes pose an infrastructure-security threat.
No. This is an independent open-source intelligence (OSINT) project. All data comes from public sources, and the analysis methods and code are published on GitHub. It does not represent any government or official body.
本專案旨在透過多源衛星數據與 AI 分析技術，即時監測台灣周邊海域的「灰色地帶」活動。我們追蹤關閉 AIS 訊號的「暗船」(dark vessels)、異常船舶行為，以及可能與軍事活動相關的海上活動模式，為海洋安全研究與政策制定提供開放、透明的數據基礎。
全球漁業觀察 (Global Fishing Watch) 的研究指出，許多船隻會關閉自動識別系統 (AIS) 訊號，使其從公共監測系統中消失。這些「暗船」往往涉及非法、未報告及未受規範的捕魚活動 (IUU fishing)，也可能與灰色地帶軍事行動有關。
本專案採用與 Global Fishing Watch 相同的核心技術——合成孔徑雷達 (Synthetic Aperture Radar, SAR) 衛星影像分析。SAR 技術不受日夜與天候影響，能穿透厚雲層偵測海面船隻。
本系統針對海底電纜破壞威脅，建立多層次可疑船隻識別機制：
本系統整合以下數據來源，每 6 小時自動更新：
This project uses multi-source satellite data and AI analysis to monitor "gray zone" activities in waters around Taiwan in real time. We track "dark vessels" (ships with AIS turned off), anomalous vessel behavior in military exercise zones, and maritime activity patterns potentially linked to military exercises — providing an open, transparent data foundation for maritime security research and policy.
Research by Global Fishing Watch shows that many vessels disable their Automatic Identification System (AIS), disappearing from public monitoring systems. These "dark vessels" are often involved in illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUU fishing) and may also be linked to gray zone military operations.
This project uses the same core technology as Global Fishing Watch — Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) satellite imagery analysis. SAR works day and night, in any weather, penetrating cloud cover to detect vessels at sea.
The system detects potential submarine cable threats through multi-layered suspicious vessel identification:
The system integrates data from the following sources, updated every 6 hours:
從海底電纜的基礎知識到台灣的執法挑戰——六篇深度文章帶你完整了解這場無形的海底戰爭。
From submarine cable fundamentals to Taiwan's enforcement challenges — six articles covering the full picture of the invisible underwater war.